Emigration to Italy from Germany and from the countries occupied and annexed by Nazi Germany has remained a largely neglected and unfamiliar topic.1 Research in the two Germanies has ignored it as well as the more specific subject of Jewish emigration to Italy. Even at the time, 1933-1945, exile in Italy could not be publicized and thus to a large extent went unnoticed. Moreover, the problem of sources is more difficult for Italy than for other countries of asylum. There is also an a priori incredulity that persons persecuted by the Nazis found refuge in fascist Italy, a country that established close relations with the Nazis after a brief phase of rivalry and tension. To understand the prerequisites for emigration to Italy requires more precise knowledge about the specific differences between National Socialism and Italian fascism.2
There is no question that Nazism and Fascism were closely related systems, particularly if contrasted with the model of parliamentary democracy. The exclusion of opposition parties and organizations, the irrational cult of the leader, the centralized control of the media, the ruthless persecution of political opponents, and the thorough penetration of all areas of life by the police and spies must be kept in mind even when it seems appropriate to consider subtle differences between Germany and Italy.
Similarities also existed in the social basis of the seizure and implementation of power. Both systems were based on the so-called traditional elites in the economy, administration, and army. These elites perceived their established interests and privileges best preserved by entrusting political leadership to the new elites that had emerged from a predominantly petty bourgeois mass movement. Thus the assumption of power in both countries was actually more a matter of relinquishing power. However, there is a striking difference between Italy and Germany in the distribution of power. In Italy the aristocratic, bourgeois, and clerical mainstay of fascism, called the fiancheggiatori, probably had a somewhat stronger position as a whole. Evidence for this assertion is that even after the "March on Rome" the fascists held only seven percent of the parliamentary seats, and in Mussolini's first administration held only six of the 16 cabinet posts. The nature of the social alliance allowed some latitude for the continued existence of bourgeois- liberal culture and prefascist governmental practice. The presence of the Vatican and the royal dynasty could be considered moderating factors, for the cult of the Duce had to compete with their ongoing impetus for integration.
Keeping in mind the millions of victims of Nazi racial policy, one profound difference between the two systems, doubtless the most important, is the completely different relationship of Italian fascism to the Jews.3 One reason for this contrast dates from the attainment of equal civil rights for the Jews during the Risorgimento. After this change in status, Italian Jews were closely linked with the liberal monarchy and achieved rapid assimilation into Italian society. Their assimilation is evident from the large number of intermarriages with Catholics-in many regions as great a number as one-third-and the diminishing intensity of religious and congregational life.
In contrast to central Europe, there were scarcely any antisernitic movements in Italy prior to World War I, apart from the traditional antisernitism among some of the clergy, particularly the Jesuits. The modern racial antisernitism that emerged especially in Prussia and Austria during the recession of the 1880s, employing economic, political, and to a large extent even racist arguments, had hardly reached Italy. Fascism thus did not emerge from an already prevailing antisernitic climate, and it is therefore not surprising that initially its program was free of antisernitic goals.
After gaining power, Mussolini's government pursued a policy of integration toward the tiny group of approximately 40,000 Jews, expecting strict political loyalty from them. Consequently, Italian Jews faced little discrimination until the mid-1930s. In 1930 the Comprehensive Law on the Jewish communities was passed; the statute assured their rights. The Union of Jewish Communities of Italy (Unione delle Comunita Israelitiche Italiane) with an office in Rome, served as the central umbrella organization. Legally there was no obstacle to providing help for other Jews who had emigrated to Italy because of persecution elsewhere.
Italian Jews behaved no differently than the Italian population as a whole toward fascism. There were Jews among Mussolini's followers from the first; they had participated in the "March on Rome" and were registered members of the Fascist Party. They also held high government offices and even served in the Cabinet. On the other hand, more Jews were active and to a large extent took the lead in the various antifascist groups within and outside Italy. Only after the Nazis seized power in Germany were strikingly antisernitic positions voiced, and these intensified into virtual campaigns until the introduction of Italian racial legislation. At first anti-jewish feelings arose primarily in connection with the activities of the small Zionist groups, suspected of being antinationalist because of their goal of establishing a state in Palestine. Increasingly, however, the familiar arsenal of political and economic antisernitic defamations was used.
It is still not possible to explain definitively the motives that prompted Mussolini to initiate in the autumn of 1938 a racial policy strongly derivative of the German model. One of the main provisions of the decree of 17 November bearing the designation "Measures for the Defense of the Italian Race," was that persons of Jewish origin, irrespective of their own religious affiliation, were banned from public service; forbidden to attend state schools, universities, and educational facilities; could not enter civil marriages with Aryans; and were prohibited from engaging in a significant part of their economic activity. Later measures restricted the practice of independent professions by Jews, and censorship of publications was widespread. Even though the decrees were not strictly implemented-there were numerous exceptions-it is nonetheless possible to speak of the exclusion of Jews from public life and the economy. The persecution proceeded bloodlessly and there was almost no terror in the streets. Italian fascism had never planned extermination and destruction.
Secret reports of the police about popular opinion likewise confirm what was noted also by foreign observers, namely, that at no time was racial policy popular. Therefore, the most illuminating and now generally accepted explanation for the introduction of the racial law is that Mussolini carried out an act of voluntary Gleichschaltung ["coordination"] for opportunistic reasons in foreign policy and as a sign of solidarity with Nazi Germany.
An additional difference that favored the settlement of Jewish and non- Jewish emigrants in Italy was fascism's cultural and political tendency to permit the existence of various styles in art, literature, and music to exist concomitantly as long as they were not involved in any political or socially critical commitment. Artistic activity was of course subject to numerous regulations and controls.4 But while Nazism declared almost all trends in modem art since expressionism to be degenerate, replacing them by a doctrine of art that climaxed in a heroic realism, fascism considered the futurist movement its own and claimed to have made Italy the cradle of modern art and architecture. Painters who were no longer permitted to exhibit in Germany or who had refused to join the Reichskulturkammer were permitted to exhibit in Italy.
Books by well-known authors were still translated into Italian long after the authors themselves had been expelled from Germany. The most striking example is Heinrich Mann's Henry IV, which was published in 1937 in Milan by Mondadori, although the author was then already head of the German Popular Front committee in Paris.5 In France, to which Mann felt so deeply grateful, that work was issued only a year later by a small and basically unknown publisher. The receptiveness toward German culture had such strong roots in Italy as a tradition that fascism was reluctant to break it off directly. A reversal of this policy occurred only as a result of the German- Italian rapprochement prior to the Berlin-Rome Axis. In the German-Italian cultural treaty of November 1938, both countries agreed to impede the dissemination of "distorting literature" written by emigrants. A draft of the Italian version contains the German word Tendenzliteratur [polemical literature], which makes it clear which side wanted this clause in the treaty.6 Under fascism there was also a gap between the letter of the law and its actual implementation. Even after 1938 artists who were proscribed in Germany exhibited in Italian galleries, and during the war the Rome opera performed Alban Berg's Wozzek.7
It must be kept in mind that the mentality of the Italian people, the result of a long historical tradition, made them sympathetic to the Jewish emigrants. Just as antisernitism was alien to them, so too was xenophobia. The foreigner, emigrant or not, was generally treated in a friendly manner. An emigrant could depend on finding understanding, sympathy, and aid in a country whose political and literary role models had themselves experienced exile-Mazzini, Garibaldi, Petrarca, and Dante.
Furthermore, certain characteristics of the liberal monarchy of the Giolitti era that had survived in the fascist system ultimately had a favorable effect on the reception of emigres. The familiar laissez-faire rule still prevailed in the civil service along with the proverbial dawdling, so that regulations were frequently not applied literally or with utter strictness. Alongside Italian bureaucratic aversion to systematized regulations there was also the readiness to take human and individual needs into consideration. These attitudes meant that the refugees could be more comfortable in Italy than in other countries, and that Italy was an attractive country of refuge despite its fascist system. But the cost of this refuge was political silence and renunciation of the struggle against Nazism.
2. The Period of Toleration, 1933-1938
The first large wave of emigration immediately after the Reichstag fire on 27 February 1933 completely excluded Italy, for it affected a group of persons who in most instances were threatened with arrest because of their political opposition to the regime. Their chaotic departure took place under dramatic circumstances, and their destinations were usually countries bordering Germany, for example, France, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland.
After the first comprehensive act of intimidation and terror against the Jewish population in early April 1933, the basic situation was somewhat different. The boycott of stores and independent professions was accompanied in many places by violence. Like the dismissal of bureaucrats and employees from the civil service that started soon thereafter within the framework of racial policy, the boycott was aimed at the occupational and material ruin of the Jews in order to force them into emigration. Provided there was no fear of being shipped to a concentration camp, a measure used at that time mainly for political reasons, there was usually still time to plan a long- term or short-term emigration, weighing its risks against a change of occupation or occupational retraining in Germany. In addition to anxiety about more extensive legal restrictions as well as about the violence and force that could erupt again at any moment, there was soon a new social reason for emigration: unemployment and need, which affected certain occupational groups more severely than others.
Considering the large number of Jews and the lack of willingness of many countries to take them in, there remained no choice but to use every possible place of refuge that was offered; in this situation the political system could not be the only criterion. After all, Italy offered itself to all who were subject to occupational restrictions and pressures, even if they had not belonged to a political organization or been endangered by racial policy. This was the case with numerous writers and artists as well as with persons who for ethical reasons rejected the Nazi system and wanted to leave, but without breaking off all ties in Germany. In these instances one must speak not of emigration but rather of a withdrawal that resembled an "inner emigration."
The antisernitic excesses of spring 1933 also had an effect in Italy. The attitude of the fascist press has not yet been studied, but as a whole it seems to have reflected Nazi views. In contrast, Jewish newspapers and magazines dared to address the issues and were evidently not impeded from objectively reporting in detail about these events. Although the Italian public heard nothing about the matter, the events temporarily disturbed even Mussolini, but only in the sense that he feared the isolation of the Nazi regime, which he believed to be still insecure, by Western European countries. Acting as Hitler's mentor, he sent well-meaning advice, in late March, via the Italian ambassador in Berlin, to restrict antisernitic measures since they were avoidable and could jeopardize the outcome of the Nazi revolution. The Italian dictator failed to recognize Hitler's determination. Not impressed in the slightest, Hitler suggested that Mussolini understood nothing about the Jewish problem.8
It is against the background of this intermezzo that the decision by the Italian Foreign Office to grant Jewish emigrants permission to settle in Italy "to the extent that it does not involve persons who were active in political parties directed against fascism" must be viewed.9 Around the same time the Ministry of Interior granted the wish of the Union of the Jewish Communities of Italy to raise money to assist their persecuted coreligionists. The fundraising appeal, issued on 26 April, was signed by well-known representatives of Jewish life and received contributions from all the Jewish communities in Italy. It was a brilliant success, collecting 759,306 lire (more than 150,000 Reichsmarks), of which 400,000 lire were immediately sent to Chaim Weizmann in London for the Palestine Fund for German Jews. The rest was kept in Italy in order to assist those in need.
In the following months, Jewish aid committees were created in many cities. Basically, they restricted their work to providing advice to arriving emigrants and answering inquiries mainly from Germany. Gradually the committees set up branch offices in Milan, Rome, and Trieste, which corresponded with refugee aid organizations in Germany and other countries of exile. The funds did not suffice for providing regular support of emigrants. Usually financial aid was used up in one contribution toward lodging or by paying for the cost of a ticket to continue the journey. In urgent cases a one-time payment was issued for living expenses, the amount of which was established for each case.10
Since April there had been a slow but steady stream of refugees arriving in Italy, which continued until Italy entered the war on 10 July 1940. Estimates by the Jewish aid committees about the extent of the emigration do not yield a complete picture and in general are too high. Greater accuracy can be obtained from the statistical inquiries made by the foreign police in the Ministry of Interior through circulars to the prefects (prefetti) of the 94 provinces. For October 1934 the answers show 1,129 "refugees of the Jewish faith" (978 German citizens, 144 Polish citizens, and 7 stateless persons). For May 1936 there were 1,481 "German citizens" (out of a total of 5,925 foreign Jews, who for the most part were already living in Italy before 1933).11 The prefects were themselves aware, however, that these figures could at best offer a vague approximation. The statistics were based on estimates, and some officials stated that it was impossible to provide any statistics because religious affiliation was not given in either passports or residence permits. Furthermore, the officials hesitated to solicit data from the Jewish communities. The police were in fact unable to distinguish a German-Jewish emigrant from other members of the German colony. Furthermore, since there was no massive influx of refugees to Italy, the police were indifferent to the question. The figures are therefore too low even for the Jewish emigration which, as in most other countries of exile, comprised approximately 90 percent of the entire emigration.
More precise details were provided by the legal census of all "foreign Jews" living in Italy. Conducted in August and September 1938, this census was used for the preparation of the racial laws. Now questions were also asked about the religion of parents. If both parents were Jewish, the person was considered a member of the "Jewish race" in the statistics. The data was later carefully reexamined by the Directorate for Demography and Race (Direzione Generale per la Demografia ela Razza), and final categorizations were made. Police officials visited the emigrants in their residences or summoned them to the police administration (questura) for questioning. They also made concurrent inquiries from the Jewish communities. Incorrect information was punishable and also dangerous, since after mid-1937 the questura of the larger cities were assigned agents from the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP (NSDAP-Auslandsorganisation), who worked for the Gestapo and considered spying on emigrants one of their main tasks.12 If false information was discovered, emigrants were in danger of expulsion.
The result of the "census of foreign Jews" revealed that emigrants to Italy since early 1933 included:
2,803 Germans (including 30-40 stateless persons and several denaturalized Germans);
279 Poles who were formerly resident in Germany; and
402 Austrians who had found asylum in Italy after the Anschluss on 13 March 1938. 13
The largest emigrant colonies were in the provinces of Milan (1,054 Germans = 37.5 percent of all German-Jewish immigrants to Italy), Rome (317 = 11.3 percent), Bolzano (229 = 8.3 percent), Genoa (198 7.1 percent), and Florence (172 = 6.1 percent).
In addition to the total of 3,484 Germans, Poles, and Austrians, an additional 640 persons of various nationalities were mentioned but were not included in the regular list because they had been in the country only a short time and had been granted only temporary resident status. The latter consisted almost exclusively of Austrians who would otherwise have been expelled. However, the number of Polish Jews from Germany must have been higher, ca. 400, since the statistics note only the last place the passport was issued, and passports issued after arrival in Italy obviously contained no references to the prior places of residence before emigration. Considering that the authorities themselves estimated a statistical error of ± 10 percent and that most prefects did not include children entered on their mothers' passports in their lists, it is probable that 4,000-4,500 Jewish emigrants out of a total of 4,500-5,000 emigrants from the Third Reich were living in Italy in the fall of 1938.
It must be noted, however, that in the months prior to the September 1938 census the total number of refugees had already decreased. The widespread arrests of refugees during Hitler's state visit in May 1938, a topic that will be dealt with later, had already caused increased departures, since emigrants no longer felt secure in Italy. Furthermore, as early as August 1938 a decree was issued that prohibited Jewish students from Germany and Austria to begin or continue their education at Italian educational institutions. 14
The Milan Aid Committee estimated that in the summer of 1938 there were 6,000 Jewish emigrants from Germany and Austria.15 This figure is probably too high, even though it proved practically impossible to implement a ban on the entry of Austrian Jews, imposed a few days after the annexation of Austria. In many instances it had been possible to circumvent the ban.16 Up to September 1938, we can estimate that 1,500-2,000 Austrian Jewish refugees arrived in Italy, some of them having fled in order to escape arrest and detention in concentration camps. A large number of Jewish refugees were taken in temporarily by Switzerland soon after their arrival in Italy when the Italian provincial authorities declared their stay illegal and had threatened them with expulsion. This possible way of continuing the journey ceased on 30 August when, in response to the heavy influx, the Swiss consulate stopped issuing visas.17 Between 10 and 13 August alone, 350 German, Austrian, and Polish Jews applied for entry visas at the Swiss consulate in Milan.18
Austrian Jews undoubtedly comprised a large number of the 1,152 persons who, according to the Ministry of the Interior, were expelled to other countries in 1938 because of illegal entry or lack of means.19 In Trieste for example, 260 persons were expelled in August 1938.20 Despite the expulsions, Jewish refugees from Austria were usually permitted a brief stay that was often extended, enabling them to secure entry into other countries, except Switzerland.
Until the beginning of World War II, which severely restricted inter- European emigration, European flight was characterized by numerous changes of residence. Many refugees probably stayed briefly in Italy for periods ranging from a few months to two years before moving to other European countries. Italy served not only as a temporary residence but also as a transit land par excellence for persons using Italian ports or ships to reach Palestine and other locations abroad. Temporary stays typify the situation in Italy because of widespread distrust of a fascist political system that offered precarious protection at best and whose attitude could change at any time, as when the racial laws were introduced in the fall of 1938.
From 1937 on the influence of Germany became increasingly clear and hardly permitted any illusions about a longer stay. Unfortunately, the available statistics show only the flow of the immigration. Of the 2,803 German emigrants of Jewish origin included in the census of September 1938, there were
| 16 | persons in Italy since 1933; |
| 286 | since 1934; |
| 294 | since 1935; |
| 583 | since 1936; |
| 618 | since 1937; and |
| 545 | since 1938.21 |
These figures reflect the general trends of Jewish emigration from Germany, which after the first wave diminished somewhat in 1934 and 1935 and then increased again after 1936.22 The significant increase, specifically applicable to Italy, between 1935 and 1936 resulted from the possibility after December 1935 of being able to transfer foreign currency because of the German-Italian clearing agreement.23
Comparing the number of persons leaving with those entering Italy, we find that between 30 and 50 percent of immigrants left Italy each year. Italy also served as a transit country for immigrants to Palestine. During the first years after 1933, approximately two-thirds of all Palestine emigration went via Italy, particularly through the port of Trieste. In Trieste, HICEM (Hebrew Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration), the large Jewish emigration organization financed the local Comitato Italiano di Assistenza agli Emigranti Ebrei, originally founded in 1921, mostly to assist emigrants from Eastern Europe. Between 1933 and 1940, a total of 121,391 persons debarked for Palestine from Trieste harbor. The number of Germans sailing from Trieste totaled 26,669 persons between 1933 and 1937 (1933: 4,033; 1934: 4,326; 1935: 5,764; 1936: 7,085; 1937: 5,461).24 Unfortunately, there are no statistics available for the later years.
An equally impressive picture of the migration movement, including transit status, is provided by the Milan Aid Committee, which reported having assisted 2,575 persons who passed through Milan between April 1933 and May 1934, in contrast with the 500 persons who settled in Milan during the same period.25
Jewish immigrants in Italy encountered extremely favorable conditions in comparison to the situation confronting foreigners elsewhere in Europe. Dating back to the prefascist era, Italy had long been intent on protecting the interests of its own citizens abroad because of the high number of Italians living in foreign countries, and they understood that restrictive entry requirements to Italy could bring about reprisals for Italians abroad. For this reason even the fascist regime, because its officials thought in traditional terms, proceeded cautiously in order to avoid conflicts. The liberal entry and settlement policy was not merely a byproduct of the promotion of tourism and shipping interests in large Italian ports.
After 1933, Italy did not require visas for entry. Even a stateless person was granted entry if an Italian consulate abroad had obtained the advance approval of the Foreign Office, and such approval was usually given. Within three days of arrival, the foreigner had to hand in a residence declaration at the nearest questura, which had to be renewed annually, and reregistration was required with each change 26 of address within the country. Actually the only surprising thing, in contrast to other European countries, is that the entry and residence regulations were not tightened and that no special regulations were made for German-Jewish emigrants even prior to the racial legislation, which stipulated a general residence ban for "alien Jews." Paradoxically, the reason lay in the political nature of the fascist system itself. Italy could afford this generosity, since its fascism deterred enough emigrants to limit their numbers. But for the first time following the annexation of Austria, when a larger wave of refugees was expected, the Italians issued an immediate order to close the border to Austrian Jews. It proved ineffective because religious affiliation could not be determined from passports at the time of entry.
In France it was considered a miracle when an exception was made and a carte de travail (work permit) was issued. In Italy there was nothing comparable to the French carte de travail. There was instead a distinction made between two different kinds of residence permits. In addition to the general permit, there was a special permit for employment (Dichiarazione di soggiorno a scopo di lavoro). Offical approval depended on the type of occupation; the independent professions and industry or commerce based on foreign capital were unrestricted.27 Therefore there was no legal obstacle to an emigrant's opening a small store, a workshop, or a studio, or to founding a language school or working as a free-lance translator. On the basis of the German-Italian Clearing Agreement of September 1934, after December 1934 there was the possibility, by deduction of the Reich emigration tax, of transferring capital in amounts up to 50,000 Reichsmarks for the purpose of investment.28
To accept salaried employment in the private sector, a foreigner needed a special permit that could be obtained by applying at the questura, who forwarded the information to Rome. The final decision was made by the Ministry of the Interior after hearing an interministerial commission whose recommendation was based on the situation of the labor market in the specific sector and specific region. The rejections usually amounted to between 10 and 20 percent. A special treatment of Jewish emigrants in comparison with other foreign employees is not revealed from the commission's files.29
Such a favorable situation in regard to approvals and rejections can only be explained in part by the fact that from the outset the companies were guided by the criteria of the commission. Thus it was advisable to provide a reason why the position could not be filled by an Italian employee and to indicate the share of foreign employees already working in the company. A small or medium-size company could hardly dare propose hiring more than one foreigner.
An emigrant who had opened a store or workshop with a small amount of capital was therefore as a rule not in a position to attract other emigrants, for the capital flow from abroad was supposed to benefit the Italian labor market. Actually the number of applications was not very high.30 Therefore, the matter of salaried employment was blocked less by legal obstacles than by the limited opportunities of the labor market.
Despite assertions to the contrary by the regime, Italy suffered less than other countries from the consequences of the international depression. Officially somewhat more than one million Italian unemployed were reported between 1933 and 1935. In reality, however, their number may have been significantly higher. Nonetheless, one gets the impression that up to the introduction of racial legislation, which resulted in a general ban on the employment of "alien Jews," most emigrants who had been gainfully employed in Germany were likewise able to work in Italy.
In Italy the widespread practice of unregistered or illegal employment proved to be extremely advantageous for Jewish refugees. The practice was able to flourish under a system based on protection and corruption, so it was customary that most of the itinerant dealers among the emigrants worked without a work permit.31
For doctors there were possibilities of earning a living in private clinics and spas. The head doctor compensated himself for the protection by paying the emigrants who were dependent on him at less than the Italian salary levels. If the authorities became aware of the illegal hiring, as a rule nothing happened except for a warning and a demand to dismiss the aliens.32 Expulsions due to illegal employment, which were frequent in France and Switzerland, occurred only after repeated warning and were in fact very rare in Italy. As with entry into the country, there is the question why the labor regulations for emigrants were not generally tightened in the course of time. Here, too, the routine protection of the Italian employee working abroad may have been the main motive. When too many refugees demanded admittance to a specific profession, the authorities closed the door, as was the case with physicians. According to the Italian medical law, foreign physicians could freely practice in Italy if they had previously taken Italian examinations. In the fall of 1933 several medical faculties felt prompted by the suddenly increasing number of registrations of German physicians in the examination lists to request general directives from the Ministry of Education. In response, the Ministry of Education required additional conditions before permitting foreigners to take the examination.33 On 5 March 1935 a new medical law was finally enacted that denied foreigners the new permit to practice medicine.34
The second restriction occurred at German behest. In November 1936 the representative of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront in Italy requested that the Ministry of the Interior grant work permits to maids, female teachers, and employees only if they were registered in the (German) Female Labor Front. The official reason mentioned was the danger of a freer lifestyle, which could damage the German image. Undoubtedly, however, the measure was aimed at eliminating one of the most important fields of employment for emigrant women to the advantage of members of the German colony who were loyal Nazis.35
Using occupation as a criterion, census figures show that immigrants to Italy were primarily from the middle or lower middle class; this applied as well to the German Jewish refugees. The census of September 1938, which also included occupational data, provided an accurate statistical picture of occupational structure. In this census most of the prefectures' lists leave open the question of whether the occupation was being learned or pursued in Italy. Of the previously mentioned 2,803 German emigrants of Jewish origin, there were 1,551 men and 1,215 women (for 37 persons no gender data emerges since they were listed only as family members). The gender difference is the most striking in the industrial city of Milan (with 643 men to 411 women, while 120 men to 109 women lived in the province of Bolzano and 147 men to 170 women lived in the province of Rome).
Among the refugee men, the largest group was in trade: 30.6 percent in Italy as a whole, compared to 46.9 percent in Milan. Leading positions in industry-the census lists them as "industrialist, manufacturer, director"- comprised 3.3 percent (5 percent in Milan). Some 4.3 percent were listed as employees in the private sector. Among them, the category for hotel business and tourism was relatively high at 1.4 percent. Skilled trade comprised 6.8 percent. In this category, a total of 27 photographers was the most numerous contingent.
Various academic professions comprised 13.4 percent and included 100 doctors, 12 dentists and dental technicians, 4 pharmacists, 3 architects, 25 engineers, 18 chemists, 33 jurists, of whom 22 were lawyers, and 12 with degrees in humanities. In addition, there were 24 teachers, 6 translators and interpreters, 9 journalists, and 3 writers.
Among the 1.5 percent in the arts, there were 14 musicians including 2 conductors and 3 composers, 14 painters, 2 sculptors, 6 actors, and 1 film director.
One of the smallest groups in the 1938 census was agriculture, at 1.0 percent, or 15 persons. There were still fewer laborers. Actually only one person, one Jakob Rothschild from Frankfurt am Main who resided in Trieste, specified his occupation as a laborer. In contrast, the category of education was large, comprising 17.1 percent students and apprentices. Of all refugee men, 12.3 percent indicated that they lived from pensions and savings.
The situation among the women yields a significantly different image that is characteristic of their social position at that time. Housewives comprised 57.3 percent, and 14.5 percent stated that they covered their living expenses from their own funds or from pensions. Some 8.5 percent were in education (7.1 percent students and 1.4 percent pupils and apprentices). The remaining 19.7 percent of the women were mainly distributed among the following occupational groups: trade and industry, 0.6 percent; employees in the private sector, 3.2 percent, of whom 1.3 percent were in the hotel trade; skilled trades, mainly seamstresses, 1.5 percent; various academic professions, 2.4 percent, including 24 physicians, 3 scientists, 1 judge, 1 literary scholar, and 1 historian; teaching, 2.4 percent; social work, 0.7 percent, plus 7 translators, interpreters, and foreignlanguage secretaries, 2 journalists, and 1 writer; the arts, 1.5 percent, including 3 musicians, 8 painters, and 7 actresses. There are no data available for 4.7 percent of these women.36
One would not readily assume that there were a large number of political emigrants in Italy under fascism, especially if one thinks of the statement of the Italian Foreign Office in the spring of 1933, according to which "persons actively involved in parties opposing fascism" should not be granted residence in Italy. At issue in the overwhelming majority of cases were simply local members of larger organizations. To a large extent, these persons were also threatened in Germany as both racial and political opponents of the regime. Thus in Italy there were frequently former members of the Social Democratic Party, the Reichsbanner, the German Democratic Party, as well as members of politically affiliated professional organizations and student groups. The Reichstag deputy Joseph Herzfeld was conspicuous among the few communists. From 1934 until his death in 1939, the elderly man lived quietly near Bolzano, apparently unmolested because of his age.37 The most prominent figures came primarily from political Catholicism and the Center Party, for which the influential position of the Catholic Church under fascism was decisive. There were also a number of well-known Catholic journalists, priests, and clerics whom the Nazis found disagreeable. Among these was Friedrich Muckermann, founder of the religious exile magazine Der deutsche Weg in Holland.
In this context the former German Chancellor Joseph Wirth must be mentioned. On 23 March 1933 he obtained a passport from the German Consulate in Rome and afterward moved back and forth between Italy, France, Switzerland, and Austria. He was registered in Rome until he left Italy at the end of 1937.38
The fate of the last deputy of the Center Party, the prelate Ludwig Kaas, is known. He did not return to Germany following negotiations for the concordat between the Third Reich and the Holy See in 1933 and later was appointed director of the papal buildings and grounds in Vatican City.39
It is impossible, however, to prove any traces of political activity in Italy. For the former members of parties, organizations, and clubs, emigration to Italy meant withdrawal from politics. The existence of exile organizations who might have opposed the Nazi system and might have maintained lines to other Western European countries was inconceivable under fascism. On the other hand, any illegal activity would have resulted in immediate expulsion. From the outset, the emigrants were under police surveillance, which kept files on "suspicious persons" and dispatched a troop of spies to snoop around emigrants in all areas of life to try to find out their political attitudes.40
Even prior to the German-Italian rapprochement, the police tended to see a potential opponent of fascism in anyone persecuted by the Nazis. On their own, however, they were not in a position to check the political activity of refugees prior to emigration. Better possibilities of control were created only after the secret German-Italian Police Agreement of April 1936 and the assignment of NSDAP-Auslandsorganisation members to the questura of the ten most important cities after mid-1937. This control was limited, however, to specific questions from the Gestapo about individuals and did not involve systematic investigations of all emigrants.41
If former membership in an organization became known, it resulted in increased surveillance but not expulsion until 1938. In individual cases emigrants were requested to leave Italy. Evidently the police was sure of itself and convinced that the refugees were politically inactive except for a few tolerated Zionist groups.
The full extent of politically organized emigrants prior to 1933 only became apparent to the Italian police when the Gestapo submitted lists of Germans to be placed under surveillance and arrested during Hitler's state visit in May 1938.42 Of the 500 individuals arrested during Hitler's state visit, barely 200 had previously belonged to political organizations and professional associations during the Weimar era.
It is hard to discern the relationship of the emigrants to the political system of fascism in an environment that demanded a certain accommodation in order to avoid looking conspicuous or politically suspicious. The fact that the Mussolini regime did not implement a racial policy until the fall of 1938 was surely decisive as a prerequisite for Jewish emigration to Italy. But several German Jews sympathized to some extent with the fascist regime, such as members of the Reichsbund Judischer Frontsoldaten and the Bund Nationaldeutscher Juden, who were attached to authoritarian traditions.
With the few exceptions of convinced fascists, the impression emerges that the Italian political system was unimportant for those refugees who selected Italy. Italy was attractive primarily for economic and practical reasons. Apart from Palestine, Italy was the only country into which it was temporarily possible to transfer larger amounts of foreign currency for living expenses. Italy offered better work opportunities than many other countries, and living expenses were cheaper, which in turn made possible the extension of savings and assets. Finally, it was a more favorable intermediate station for later emigration.
Apart from showing restraint in expressing political opinions, it was a good precaution for employed persons to join the syndicates of corporations. Research confirms that there were German-Jewish refugees who maintained contact with influential personalities and cooperated as precautionary measures with the Italian ministry for propaganda [Ministero della cultura popolare]. Such contacts did not cease with the rapprochement between Italy and Germany, for several refugees attempted to assure their future security through submissiveness and servility to their Italian protectors.
Only one example among many will be related here. From the Tessin the author Walter Mechauer sent an ode to the Duce requesting asylum. Mussolini indirectly thanked Mechauer via the Italian consulate in Locarno and invited him to come to Italy. Following the expulsion decree for "alien Jews" in the fall of 1938, Mechauer hoped that Mussolini's invitation might assist him, and he gave a copy of the letter to the Ministry of the Interior via the prefect of Salerno, but without success.43
Among the writers and artists who had gone to Italy after the Nazi seizure of power, only emigrants threatened by Nazi racial persecution can be considered here. Armin T. Wegner had courageously written to Hitler in 1933 and was consequently sent to a concentration camp and whipped because of his valiant intercession on behalf of the Jews. Nevertheless, he remained in steady contact with the German Embassy and the various German cultural and scientific institutions in Italy. He even spent several months in Germany, and from 1941 to 1943 was in Padua in his official capacity as lecturer at the Germany Academy.44 The position of Stefan Andres, a Catholic author who had left Germany in protest against the pogrom of November 1938, was similar. Mostly he lived quietly in Positano but was still able to publish individual works such as We Are Utopia in Germany despite the fact that he was excluded from the Reichsschrifttumskammer.45
Among the Jewish writers forced to flee Germany, the most famous are Alfred Neumann, Walter Hasenclever, Alice Berend, and Karl Wolfskehl. An interesting situation developed when two of Neumann's novels, written in a villa in Fiesole near Florence, were initially published in German by Allert de Lange in Holland and subsequently by Mondadori in Milan in an Italian translation.46
Among refugee artists in Italy we mention only Adolf Fleischmann, Rudolf Levy, Felix Nussbaum, and Michel Fingesten. Fleischmann is considered an important representative of abstract painting. Like Levy, he came to Italy from Spain, and on the island of Ischia he changed his style from objective to abstract. Shortly before Hitler's state visit he went to France, where he survived in hiding in the Department of Tam during the German occupation.47
Starting in 1938, Levy lived at first on Ischia and later in Florence. After Italy entered the war, he was not interned because of his advanced age. In 1944 he fell into the hands of the Gestapo and was deported to Auschwitz, from where he never returned.48
After the forced interruption of the young Felix Nussbaum's fellowship at the Villa Massimo, a German artist's residence in Rome, he remained on the Ligurian coast for approximately one-and-a-half years, painting mainly restrained harbor and street scenes. It was at a later period while in hiding in Brussels prior to his deportation that he created the shattering self-portraits and the scenes recalling the medieval dances of death in which loneliness, anxiety, and the premonition of death are reflected.49
Michel Fingesten, a now largely forgotten painter and graphic artist of rank, combined a poetic fantasy with macabre humor. He first lived in Milan and was later interned in Ferramonti-Tarsia in Calabria until he was liberated by the Allies. He died in Cosenza in 1946.50
In Italy there were also numerous so-called "semi-emigrants," such as Hans Purrmann, the director of the Villa Romana in Florence,51 who applied the term to himself. Another was the sculptress Jenny Wiegmann-Mucchi.52 These were artists who on their own had broken with the forced political conformity of art in Germany or who no longer perceived any possibility for having an effect. Some had in fact already been declared degenerate by the Nazis. Scattered throughout Italy there were two to three dozen well-known and less well- known artists, sculptors, and craftsmen who sought in seclusion to use whatever remained of their modest independence.
The increasing German influence led to a deterioration of the exiles' situation in Italy. The already-mentioned secret German-Italian Police Agreement had the most severe consequences. The Agreement was concluded in Berlin on 1 April 1936 by an Italian delegation under the direction of the police chief Arturo Bocchini with Himmler, Heydrich, and several representatives of the Gestapo.53 In the preliminary discussions the Germans tried unsuccessfully to pressure the Italians into recognizing the "Jewish danger." The text of the Agreement therefore referred only to combatting communists, freemasons, and emigrants, by which ultimately all political opponents of both regimes were meant.
The agreement had severe consequences for the Jewish emigrants, since it permitted the Gestapo to create a general mistrust of Jews as "subversive elements" by giving information about their earlier political activities. The Agreement provided for an exchange of information, documents, pieces of evidence, and police identification material; it was also to include political emigrants in other countries, above all Spain and France. The Gestapo could henceforth request the Italian police to interrogate, arrest, and expel a refugee. In return, the Italian police had the possibility of obtaining information about "suspects." Still more decisive was a rider to the Agreement, which was recorded at Himmler's request and which the Italian delegation did not wish to include in the text without consulting Mussolini: "In cases of justified suspicion, the German and the Italian police would mutually extradite political criminals without diplomatic negotiation, provided that there was no contravening national interest."
The Gestapo must have considered the rider particularly important, as the applicable German-Italian Extradition Agreement of 1871 provided no effective handle for political cases. In August 1934 the Gestapo learned that the Italian Ministry of Justice would uphold international legal norms by refusing the extradition of the political refugee Arthur Hurlebusch, whom the Gestapo hoped to get their hands on under the pretext of theft. Under dramatic circumstances Hurlebusch had escaped from Dachau to Austria, which rejected a German request for extradition, permitting him instead to leave Austria to travel to Italy. With the assistance of the Jewish Aid Committee in Milan, he later managed to arrive illegally in France.54
The Police Agreement started in July 1936 with the exchange of police attaches at both embassies. Theodor Helmerking was appointed as the German representative in Rome. From the beginning a significant share of the inquiries by both sides dealt with German emigrants in Italy and with members of the Italian colony in Germany. It is not generally known, but Italians in Germany had served as couriers and as members of communist cells, had participated in acts of opposition as spokesmen at employment walkouts, and had therefore been arrested.
An occasion to test Mussolini's willingness in regard to extradition occurred as early as October 1936, when the German General Consulate in Milan refused to renew the passport of an employee at the Soviet trade mission in Milan by the name of Julius Hoffmann and reported the matter to Berlin. The Gestapo then requested that the Italian police "examine the possibility whether Hoffmann could not be expelled from Italy as an undesirable alien and be put on board a German ship bound for Hamburg." Hoffmann was alleged to have been a long-time communist functionary who was wanted for high treason and for betraying his country. It was hoped that certain acts of economic espionage might be explained through him. Bocchini, head of the Italian Police, asked Mussolini, who also served as Minister of the Interior, and noted afterwards: "Correct (sta bene). He can be sent away and put on a German ship. The German police must be informed." On 24 January 1937 Hoffmann was handed over to the captain of the ship, the Leverkusen in Genoa.55 The same procedure was proposed by the Gestapo a short time later for the emigrant Willi von Bracht, who had fled to Holland in 1936 and from there had reached Rome on a forged passport under the name of Hans Harlinghausen. In Rome he at first lived in a Catholic guest house before getting a job as gardener in a cloister in the vicinity of Rome. In the guest house he allegedly spread "horror reports about Germany and expressed himself in a hateful manner against the Fiihrer." Whether or not this was the real reason for demanding his extradition, von Bracht was arrested on 19 May 1937 and taken to a ship in Genoa on 6 August.56
Afterwards there were no more extraditions until mid-1938. The persons threatened with arrest were either able to get away in time, or extradition was postponed because of court proceedings in Italy or because they were already in custody and according to Italian law could not be handed over before being sentenced. In several cases one of the two parties considered extradition inopportune. Consequently, in addition to the request for extradition, the practice of an offer of extradition soon came into being.
In the wording of the Gestapo, such practice was usually disguised by the trivial formula: "Are there any other wishes in regard to the person in question." The low number of extraditions in the first two years of the Agreement can be explained by the self-interest of both parties in preventing scandals in the German or Italian exile press or in the European left-wing press, and in having the cooperation proceed as inconspicuously as possible.57
Despite repeated offers for extradition by the Gestapo, the Italians waited until July 1938 to cash in. Heydrich, in a personal letter to Bocchini, reported the arrest of Angelo Ursella, who had been sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in 1927 by the Italian Special Tribunal because of alleged participation in an assassination attempt against Mussolini. In 1936 he married an Austrian and was running a small brickyard near Vienna. Probably for this reason he did not want to leave after the annexation of Austria and hoped to remain undetected. He was handed over to the Italian police.58
The Police Agreement was applied consistently until the German occupation after 8 September 1943. The person responsible for its implementation was SS Obersturmbannffihrer Kappler, who served as the police attache to the German Embassy in Rome starting in mid-1939. Kappler was later responsible for the murder of hostages in the Fosse Ardeatine during the occupation of Rome.
Following Italy's entrance into the war, the number of extraditions increased and may have amounted to four or five persons per month. Only in isolated instances was there a Jew among these, because after Italy's entrance into the war most of the Jews were interned and hence were out of reach of Nazi spies and the Gestapo. After the annexation of Austria, the common border facilitated the technical and legal aspects of extradition: there was no longer any practical distinction between extradition (estradizione), expulsion (espulsione), deportation (allontanamento), and repatriation (rimpatrio), since the Gestapo needed only to intervene along the Brenner Pass or at Arnoldstein.
At the beginning, police cooperation went unnoticed by the emigrants. The danger became clear only when, within the framework of security measures for the state visit of Hitler between 3 and 9 May 1938, the Gestapo and the Italian police jointly undertook a large-scale raid against German, Austrian, and Polish citizens in Italy, and this primarily affected the refugees.
In October or November 1937 the first meeting took place between Heinrich Muller, SS-Standartenfuhrer and head of the Gestapo, one of the most powerful men in the police system behind Himmler and Heydrich, and Guido Leto, the official in the Italian Ministry of the Interior who was responsible for cooperation with the German police. It was agreed to check the political reliability of all Germans, "ex-Austrians," and Poles residing in Italy-in other words, more than 20,000 individuals. Within this group, emigrants and Jews were considered suspicious from the outset. In this respect the Italian side made a concession that they had evaded during the negotiation for the Police Agreement (April 1936). As might be expected, the proposal to check all German citizens emanated from the Gestapo, which referred to the security measures during the state visit of Mussolini in Germany in September 1937, when all Italians who were registered in Germany were investigated.59
During discussions between Helmerking and Leto the procedure was established in detail. The investigation should begin in the offices of each questura, to which trusted members of the NSDAP Foreign Organization were assigned in 22 cities, supplementing the previously appointed ten local Nazis.60 The jointly prepared lists were then to be sent to the Ministry of the Interior, which compared them with the main central card-catalog of political opponents and then submitted them to Helmerking. Gestapo headquarters would then summarize the results of their investigations into refugee political activities prior to emigration and in other countries.
In October and December, the Ministry of the Interior instructed the prefects and the offices of the questura, who were subordinate to them, to divide the lists into three categories: "definite Hitler supporters, politically suspicious persons, and Germans who were not known or were only slightly known to the consulates and the Nazi organizations in Italy."61 The first two lists of "politically suspicious persons," which dealt almost exclusively with refugees, were submitted in late November. Starting in January 1938, the first lists of the "unknown and less known German citizens" reached Helmerking. The lists of "Germans from Austria," which had been requested by the NSDAP Foreign Organization following Anschluss in a letter to Bocchini, started to arrive on 1 April 1938.62 From the beginning of January to the start of the state visit, the Gestapo received a total of 599 lists from the provinces.63
In mid-March the Gestapo presented their proposals with the submission of the first reports. The reports were summarized into lists that were divided into "dangerous," "suspicious," and "persons about whom there is no reason for suspicion." The first group was to be "rendered harmless" by arrest or similar measures (i.e., expulsion) during the state visit, and the second group was to be kept under close surveillance.64
The Italians were in agreement and even contributed their share by ordering that the "suspicious persons" likewise be arrested in the cities to be visited by Hitler-Florence, Rome, and Naples. Two lists were then sent to the questura: "List A: Germans to be arrested" and "List B: Germans to be kept under close surveillance."65
The exchange of lists constituted only a part of the security measures that undoubtedly were intended simultaneously to provide a demonstration of the Gestapo's efficiency and to intimidate the refugees into departing from Italy. In a letter of 9 February Heydrich called Bocchini's attention to the "dangers" that, as was generally known, were to be feared especially from emigrants who had fled from Germany. He requested that for the period before and during the state visit, Bocchini provide him with a number of officials who, on the basis of their language skills, would assist the Italian police in the investigation of personal data and during interrogations.66
At the beginning of March Heydrich traveled to Rome and discussed details of the plan with Bocchini. A total of 22 detectives were posted at 13 offices of questura in border towns, ports, and large cities. On 10 and 11 April they arrived at their destinations and were actually visible at interrogations and during house searches.67 Starting on 20 April, groups of higher police and SS officers crossed the border almost daily, some of them traveling in Nazi party uniforms, and went to their quarters in Rome, Naples, and Florence. Between 24 and 27 April Himmler, Heydrich, and Sepp Dietrich, commander of Hitler's Leibstandarte, were simultaneously in Rome to complete plans for coordinating the preparations. At the same time Gestapo Mdller organized an office with a staff of 37 Gestapo officers in Rome where, in cooperation with the Italian police, he continued the investigations that had been started by the Gestapo in Berlin until the end of the state visit.
For almost three weeks there was a total of approximately 120 Gestapo and SS officers on Italian soil, including prominent figures such as Otto Ohlendorff, Otto Rasch, Erich Ehrlinger, and Walter Schellenberg-all of whom committed atrocities during the war in occupied Europe and were pivotally involved in the "final solution." Counting the 22 trusted informants of the NSDAP Foreign Organization and 66 additional security officials who arrived in special trains with Hitler's entourage, the operation amounted to a police invasion of more than 200 men.68
The precise number of persons arrested is not noted in any document, and there is little hope that a document could be found. In the census of September 1938 there was a total of 525 Jewish emigrants registered in the cities visited by Hitler-Rome, Naples, and Florence (in May 1938 the figure must have been higher-more than 600). One-third to half of these must have been on list B, "Germans to be kept under surveillance," and were consequently arrested at the order of the Italian police. These must be added to the names on list A, "Germans to be arrested," which included 100-200 individuals. A supplementary list of approximately 30 Austrians whose names are known.69; an undeterminable number of Poles; and numerous members of the Germany colony, many of whom cannot be regarded as refugees, were also detained. Therefore, the total may have been 500, of whom at least two-thirds were Jews.
Arrests based on list A occurred on 20 April, and arrests for list B on 1 May. The release was effected through a circular of the Ministry of the Interior of 16 May but occurred somewhat earlier in many places at the command of the local prefect.70 No written reports about conditions in the prisons are available. Walter Hasenclever is said to have had his wrists in chains in Massa Carrara.71 Armin T. Wegner was lured under a pretext from Positano to Amalfi, where he was locked up with the petty criminals of the town in a large space teeming with vermin and with water dripping from the walls. Later he was taken to the prison in Salerno and placed with four other inmates.72
In Florence the majority of the approximately 100 teachers and students of the Jewish boarding school were taken away. Men and women were put into separate prisons. The archbishop of the city, Elia Dalla Costa, is said to have ameliorated the prisoners' conditions by instructing the prison priest to smuggle out mail and to establish communication between the men's and the women's prisons. As Robert Kempner recalls, the prisoners had the feeling of being kept as hostages and paradoxically had to hope that their tormentor would return to Germany unharmed.73
3. Threat of Expulsion under the Racial Laws, 1938-1940
There was a basic change in the situation of the Jewish refugees following the implementation of Italian racial legislation. The conditions of exile, relatively favorable until then in contrast to many other European countries, changed precipitously and became very bitter and oppressive. As previously mentioned, the prevailing belief today is that the Germans exerted no direct pressure on Mussolini but that, on the contrary, his decision to introduce racial policy occurred at his own initiative, although under the spell of the German model.74
The relationship between the emigration and the inauguration of the racial policy has heretofore been completely overlooked. But emigration was doubtless an important factor. The lists of the Gestapo drawn up for Hitler's state visit, with their extensive reports about the former political activities of the refugees, cannot have failed to leave an impression on Mussolini. As Minister of the Interior, he was kept informed ex ofticio. It was indeed a paradoxical situation that people who were persecuted by the Axis partners could nevertheless still find refuge under the fascist regime. The stream of refugees coming out of annexed Austria also had an impact on the birth of racial politics in Italy. It is even tempting to assume that the Nazis, who at this time practiced a brutal expulsion policy along the borders of other countries, intentionally left open the escape route to Italy after Hitler's state visit to burden the country with a refugee problem that only antisernitic measures could solve.
In fact there is a straight line from the arrests during Hitler's state visit to the law of 7 September 1938 (published on 12 September in the Gazzetta Ufficiale) that created the legal basis for the mass expulsion of the Jews who had emigrated and fled to Italy-or, as they were officially called, the "alien Jews."75 Prior to the state visit expulsion had been considered in the Ministry of the Interior as an alternative to arrest. But the objection that was made against such a massive expulsion was that the state visit could not provide the legal basis or pretext.76 It is not known whether refugees were expelled immediately on release.
The decree of 7 September, which introduced the designation "Jew" for a person, "both of whose parents are of the Jewish race," stipulated that "alien Jews" (ebrei stranieri) were basically forbidden to reside in Italy. Since the concept of "alien Jew" constituted a racial policy category, it was always placed in quotation marks when used in reference to the attitude of fascist authorities. All persons who had arrived after 1 January 1919 had to leave the country within six months or by 12 March 1939. Otherwise they were threatened with expulsion and were to be accompanied by the police up to the border. Italian citizenship acquired after 1 January 1919 was annulled for these individuals.
The regulations of the decree were incorporated into the text of the law of 17 November with some modifications. This decree, which was the codex of Italian racial legislation, provided for a three-month arrest or a fine in the amount of 5,000 lire. One concession, however, was the regulation that allowed persons older than 65 or married to Italian citizens to remain in Italy.77
The unworkability of the expulsion law was first recognized by the prefects and questors who had to deal with these matters on a daily basis. Their account of the situation was that the limited possibilities of entry into other countries excluded the departure of all affected persons by 12 March. Despite this realization, these high fascist officials continued to adhere completely to the logic of the system. They stated that the Jews had behaved loyally in regard to the regulation and that they even wanted to leave but were hindered by the absence of visas.
A letter from the prefect of Genoa containing a detailed description of the difficulties of leaving Italy read like a plea for the persecuted.78 Pressure also came from Italian shipping companies, which were interested in having a regulated exodus and steady bookings, while a mass expulsion would have caused them to lose several thousand passengers.79 However, the spokesperson for the shipping interests was always the influential Foreign Office.
Ultimately the expulsion law attracted the attention of other countries. According to the report of a British press agency, Chamberlain spoke upon behalf of the foreign Jews during his state visit in Rome in January 1939. In response Mussolini allegedly told him that the expulsion would be suspended until the conclusion of deliberations by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, an organization initiated by Roosevelt for the purpose of facilitating a controlled emigration through negotiations with the Hitler regime and potential recipient countries.80
Efforts toward support at the diplomatic level were also undertaken by the Milan Committee, which since the introduction of racial legislation was called Contitato di Assistenza agli Ebrei in Italia, or COMASEBIT, for the purpose of making clear that its aid now also extended to Italian Jews. It maintained good relations with the American consul general in Milan, Walter H. Sholes, who in personal reports called the attention of the State Department to the endangered situation of immigrant and refugee Jews. He approached the president of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, Myron Taylor, as well as others. In the last two weeks of February Myron Taylor requested an audience with Mussolini, but was refused.81 After the refusal to Taylor, the American Ambassador in Rome, William Phillips, considered it advisable to proceed cautiously, because he had the impression that Mussolini, on his own, was preparing to discontinue the expulsion, hence outside intervention could have negative repercussions.82 On 10 March Ciano, informed the ambassador officially of the suspension of the measure and expressly stressed that it would also not be implemented against emigrants from Germany and Austria.83 It cannot be determined whether Mussolini, who after Munich enjoyed his role as an international broker, was moved toward the volte-face by foreign policy considerations or was more influenced by the arguments of the prefects and questors.
Even after the suspension the decree was nonetheless legally in force and the threat of expulsion still existed. Mussolini was by no means willing to dispense with the psychological pressure of uncertainty and anxiety. He did not vacillate in his intention that "alien Jews" had to leave Italy.
Even before the deadline, the questors had begun to accept applications for an extension of residence, which required the approval of four authorities: the local questura, the Department for Race and Demography of the Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate for Public Security of the Ministry of the Interior, as well as, for a while, the Provincial Secretary of the Fascist Party. Depending upon the status of preparations for emigration, the duration of the extension was determined on a case-by-case basis but could not exceed six months. Anyone whose records included mention of suspicious activities or who was considered without financial resources had no chance of obtaining an extension.84
On 12 March the statistical situation was as follows: 3,720 "alien Jews" residing in Italy after 1 January 1919 had to leave the country. Of the 4,154 persons still in Italy and subject to the regulations, 3,190 had applied for an extension of residence. Some 933 were permitted to remain because they were over age 65 or were married to Italian citizens. Only 964 persons, none of whom had applied for extension, were to be deported. 85 The 3,190 applications for extension soon accumulated in the offices of the Department for Demography and Race that was undergoing expansion. The fact that several months were probably needed to complete the processing of these applications was for many a priceless gain in time, and thus, contrary to normal rules, this time bureaucracy worked to the advantage of the emigrants.
Mussolini had originally wanted a general entry ban for "alien Jews" in conjunction with the expulsion law. He relented, however, in response to the urging of the ministries, which did not want to jeopardize transit and tourism as a source of income for Italian shipping lines.86 Embarkation from Genoa and Naples to North and South America, particularly also from Trieste to Palestine and also to an increasing extent Shanghai, continued without disturbance. 87 Initially the determination of the length of residence for "tourism, embarkation, medical treatment, and business purposes" (soggiorno per ragioni di turismo, diporto, cura ed affari) was entrusted to the questura that processed the residence declarations. This arrangement continued until the Ministry of the Interior made a unified regulation in the second half of October that stipulated a maximum stay of three months. But barely four weeks later the Directorate for Tourism at the Ministry of Propaganda requested that the length of residence be extended to six months, and this was actually accepted by the Ministry of the Interior.88 In February the Foreign Office introduced for the owners of J-passports [passports stamped with a J to indicate a Jew] compulsory visas for transit and tourist visits. If the authorities expected the Jewish clientele to remain faithful to their traditional vacation resorts and spas after the enactment of racial legislation, they revealed considerable naivete, overconfidence, and lack of sensitivity. On the other hand, the Italians were dependent on every tourist, because in the wake of the Munich Pact the increasing danger of war was causing international tourism to stagnate. Thus, for instance, the Italian National Tourist Office in Berlin reported that, apart from Jews, it was almost impossible to interest any German tourist in a trip to Italy.89
Initially little use was made of the tourist visa for the purpose of escaping persecution, because race legislation and fear of expulsion acted as deterrents. But many would probably have made the trip to the Italian Consulate to have such a visa stamped into their passports, just in case. Up to 12 March, the number of persons entering Italy can hardly have exceeded 1000. But when it turned out that the feared mass expulsion was not forthcoming, the numbers shot up. One set of statistics for residence declarations by German citizens with J-passports mentions 539 in June 1939, 984 in July, and 1,274 in August; most of the latter had arrived by the first half of August.90 The Ministry of the Interior, after trying to find out the reasons for the new influx, concluded that the newcomers were predominantly destitute refugees who had been released a short time before from concentration camps to which they had been taken after the pogrom of November 1938. They were threatened with reinternment in a concentration camp if they had not fled across the border within a few days.91
Thus fascist Italy despite its race laws and threat of expulsion remained the sanctuary of the desperate. In response to the new wave of refugees- approximately 2,000 persons within six weekson 19 August the Ministry of the Interior, in a circular to the prefects, suspended residence permits for tourism. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda also approved this policy shift, since they were now convinced that the tourism policy had been an incalculable fiasco.92
Of the 3,053 "alien Jews" who were still in Italy, having entered the country on a tourist visa, there were 1,904 German citizens-most of them in reality Austrians-385 Poles, 223 "former Czechoslovakians" who had found their way to Italy shortly before the total occupation of their country on 16 March, and 120 stateless persons, in contrast to genuine tourists consisting of 10 Swiss, 9 Americans, 9 British, and 6 French. 93 Altogether there were probably barely 5,000 personsJews, converts, and Mischlinge who were threatened by the same infamous race policy and had escaped from Nazi domination using tourist visas.
After suspending the expulsion decree and abrogating the planned mass expulsion, the Ministry of the Interior found other ways to get rid of both the Jewish emigrants and refugees. To a large extent it used expulsion "at your own risk and at your own peril" (a loro rischio e loro pericolo), in particular on the Yugoslavian, Swiss, and especially the French borders. In the words of the Italian police, the formula "at your own risk and your own peril" meant that border officials took refugees to an unguarded place on the other side of the border, from where with some luck they could reach the interior of the country undetected. This practice was based on a telegram of 28 January 1939 to the prefects that stated: "By higher order, it is decreed that the exit of Jews who wish to settle abroad be accorded maximal facilitation."94
The questura then sent small groups to border police stations, led them to an unguarded place, or handed them over to train officials and local guides. Many emigrants and refugees had also come on their own to the border in the hope of secretly being able to cross because they had heard of the "helpful attitude" of the Italian border officials. Along the Italian side of the border the exit was formally legal: border and customs officials carried out the usual controls and assured themselves that papers were in order and that exit regulations were observed. For the countries of destination, however, it was a matter of an illegal infiltration. At the French border near Ventimiglia this had already started before 12 March and occurred with fun knowledge of the prefect of Imperia. Between 1 March and 14 August he reported a total of 378 persons had been brought across the border "in the highland region of Ventimiglia . . . without the visa of a French consulate" and an additional twelve had been put aboard ships to France.95
In contrast, Renzo Luisada, secretary of the recently disbanded Milan Aid Committee, COMASEBIT, told the American Consul General Sholes in September that approximately 800 Jewish refugees had recently left Italy, "mostly across the border of Ventimiglia, with the tacit support of the authorities."96 In view of these events the French strengthened their border patrols and sent back a number of refugees who had been seized by them. On 11 July the prefect of Imperia therefore urged the Ministry of the Interior to stop the practice of having the questura send refugees across the border.97
To obtain more precise insight into the events that seemed to elude the prefects, the Ministry of the Interior dispatched a General Inspector for Public Security to the border. His report brought to light that a share of the Jews who had been infiltrated into France had arrived in Italy only a short time before on tourist visas.98 This caused alarm in Rome. The "maximal facilitation" with which the Jews were to be inconspicuously gotten rid of had instead encouraged the flood.
Parallel to this officially controlled movement, there was also an effort by local smugglers and petty criminals between Ventimiglia and Bordigheria that tried to profit from the illicit border traffic and to elude official control. One would like to assume, even though it is not specifically confirmed, that the Milan Committee did not want to renege on the request of Jewish organizations in Berlin and Vienna to protect those persons who had been released from the concentration camps from being rearrested and returned to the camps. Renzo Luisada and Raffaela Cantoni (who was the pivotal spirit of the COMASEBIT and, as a known antifascist, remained in the background) must have known the risks. The blow was not long in coming: On 24 July Bocchini on orders from Mussolini commanded the prefect of Milan to dissolve the Committee. This occurred on 29 August.99
The debarkations to France via motorboats and fishing vessels were resumed between December 1939 and May 1940. This traffic continued under two auspices: officially regulated by the police and uncontrolled in the hands of local profiteers. Two or three transports were stopped just prior to debarkation. In other cases, the organizers, sailors, fishermen, and hotel porters were tracked down and arrested.100 Meanwhile, in December 1939 the Delegazione per l'Assistenza agli Emigranti, or DELASEM, which was the successor organization to COMASEBIT and was directly subordinate to the Union of Jewish Communities of Italy, even developed plans for illegal debarkation to Spain, which were probably never implemented.101
The growing stream of refugees in the summer of 1939, which led to the suspension of tourist visas on 19 August, had fateful consequences. One set of statistics of the Ministry of the Interior in late September made clear that of the approximately 9,000 persons affected by the expulsion decree (the figures vacillate between 8,807 and 9,170), 6,480 had meanwhile left Italy, while 2,360 (including 829 Germans and Austrians, 415 Poles, and 516 stateless persons) were still in Italy. At the same time, research revealed that an additional 2,486 persons were still in Italy on tourist visas. The authorities were aware that the total figure of 4,846 persons had hardly changed since 12 March.102
Mussolini wanted to stop this development under any circumstances. Deportation across the Yugoslavian, Swiss, and French borders became increasingly difficult because of fighter controls. It also did not show the desired success-indeed, it had even encouraged an increased influx of so- called tourists to Italy; therefore, the police chief impressed upon the prefects and questors that all persons who were in the country on tourist visas were there illegally and ordered them deported "at their own risk and at their own peril" to the "border of their entry" (frontiera di provenienza).103 It can be proven that the Ministry of the Interior ordered over 300 deportations to the German border. The larger share of these was not carried out, however, because the prefects and questors frequently acceded to Jewish committees' and congregations' pleas and shrank from this most extreme measure.104 in Genoa, for instance, whose questura was considered the most liberal in Italy, it is believed that only 12 deportations to the German border occurred, among them eight former inmates of Dachau and Buchenwald.105
The increasing cases of such deportations caused great alarm among the Jewish committees and the Union of the Jewish Communifies of Italy, and they thus turned to American Ambassador Phillips. On 8 December he spoke with Ciano, who asked him for a memorandum to present to Mussolini.106 Phillips was astonished to find that Mussolini was accessible and that contrary to expectations, the Duce promised to stop the deportations to the German border although Phillips' personal request was not an official demarche of the State Department.107 We cannot say that Mussolini made substantial concessions, since the influx caused by the suspension of tourist visas had independently come to a standstill. Moreover, the German police refused entry to the Jews who had been sent back by the Italian authorities and thus the number of refugees in Tarvisio (border crossing to Germany) started to mount.108
Foreign Minister Ciano implemented Mussolini's decision, relaying it within four days to the police chief, Bocchini. When Bocchini objected, Ciano silenced him with the argument that the residence extension "must be understood in the spirit of generosity that dictated the Duce's decision." On 24 December the Ministry of the Interior instructed the prefects to stop the deportations along the German border.109 The refugees in Italy were saved, but the tug-of war over the new arrivals continued.
The circular of 19 August did not mean a general entrance ban for those being hounded by the Nazis, since transit for purposes of debarkation from Italian ports was still possible. During the period of Italian neutrality, it constituted one of the last loopholes through which Jews could escape from Germany and annexed or occupied countries. Transit visas also facilitated illegal entry into Italy. Consulates of foreign countries in the interior of Nazi territory issued "courtesy visas," for which high sums were paid in many instances. Boat tickets and passports were falsified in incalculable numbers. In Italy, the police uncovered several forgery rings-usually emigrants working together with Italians.110 Increasingly the Italian consulates, particularly in Amsterdam, Zurich, Warsaw, and Katowice, issued visas that did not meet their own regulations. They did so, for instance, by issuing transit visas for already expired tourist visas or by recognizing visas for other countries that were to have been approved by foreign consulates in Italy after arrival.
The Ministry of the Interior was soon made very aware of the new situation by the border police, who had evidently already turned back numerous persons along the border. In response to the protest by the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Office, strengthened by Mussolini's decision, responded that entry was to be granted even if it was noticed during border control that the visa had been issued "erroneously"; this was not to be held against the holder of the visa.111
The Foreign Office therefore shielded the Italian consulates abroad and at the same time indirectly protected the refugees. But the Ministry of the Interior did not give in and made certain that the refugees began to feel its disapproval. In this manner the questura granted them a stay of only a few days, telling them that they had entered by deception and would again be deported. There were soon renewed deportations, particularly in Trieste, where several hundred refugees had gradually arrived. In Tarvisio a Polish- Jewish emigrant was even handed over to the German police, which was something that had never happened before.112 In order to be able to control developments, starting on 23 February 1940 the Ministry of the Interior published statistics on the number of persons stranded with transit visas, showing that up to the end of May there were probably 592 such persons.113 On 23 April the Foreign Office initially nullified transit visas for "Polish Jews," since they had discovered the greatest number of irregularities among this group.114 On 18 May the Ministry of the Interior finally issued a general entry ban affecting all "alien Jews."115
The constant pressure of the threat of expulsion since the autumn of 1938 as well as the possibility of entry into Italy on a tourist or transit visa led to numerous attempts at illegal immigration from Italy to Palestine under the auspices of the Aliyah Bet.116 The failure of several departures from Italy explains why preference was later given to Danube and Black Sea ports. The Italian Foreign Office initially had no reservations, provided that the refugees' entrance papers to Italy were in order and that Italian customs authorities controlled their departure. After the outbreak of the World War, however, the Foreign Office made a far-reaching agreement with the British Embassy in Rome that guaranteed transit via Trieste for holders of Palestine certificates, making it possible to save more than 2,500 persons.117 The Foreign Office realized that tolerating illegal transports would have jeopardized this agreement. From the beginning, however, the decisive resistance came from the Ministry of the Navy and the port officials. They maintained that Italy, as a signatory to the International Convention for the Protection of Human Life at Sea of 1929, could not permit ships that did not meet specifications to be used for passenger traffic from Italian ports. They warned that accidents might harm the Italian reputation. The numerous tragedies of the later Palestine-bound ships showed that their apprehension was justified.118 Greek and Yugoslavian shipowners evading Italian port authorities took the risks of carrying passengers ashore along the Palestinian coast in worn-out freighters and tugboats. The Italian port authorities refused these vessels permission to sail, mandated renovations, and imposed a limited number of passengers that would have made the trip unprofitable for the shipowners. Repeatedly, ships whose arrival had already been announced failed to show or were turned back by the port authorities, and thus the number of prospective passengers waiting in the harbor towns increased steadily. Then the Ministry of the Interior also adopted the position of opposing the transports "in the interests of public security." It was nevertheless possible for several ships to put out to sea between September 1938 and January 1940. In the cases of the "Agia Zoni" in Fiume and the "Atrato" in Naples, the prefects gave orders to the port authorities for the ships to leave even though neither of the ships had complied with the regulations.119 In this way, they wanted to get rid of the Jews who had already arrived. As the prefect of Fiume stated, "they offered a not very edifying drama."
Usually it was the revisionist Zionists who were behind the transports, both those that succeeded and those that failed. In one instance it was the Irgun, the armed underground organization in Palestine, with which they were allied; in two instances it was the Mossad.120 In the spring of 1939, the COMASEBIT was also involved in the preparation for a transport that probably was carried Out.121 in early 1940 the DELASEM approached the Ministry of Interior with a project that dealt with exits from Italy but not with transit. However, the Foreign Office now raised objections because it did not want to jeopardize the agreement with the British concerning legal exits via Trieste.122 There is documented evidence of the departure of a total of 1,720 persons on six ships from Italian ports under the auspices of the Ahyah Bet. This number included mainly Jews from Poland who probably reached their destinations in Palestine.
Since the onset of racial legislation, social conditions for the Jewish emigrants and refugees had changed, becoming steadily more serious and desperate. Up to that time, most of the single persons and heads of families had lived from their own earnings, although frequently in very modest circumstances. In late 1939 DELASEM noted that an average of only 2.7 percent of the refugees' income came from their own earnings, and that this money was usually earned illegally at occasional jobs.123
The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that after the outbreak of war cash transfers from Poland and Slovakia were stopped, and there were delays in money transfers from France, England, and the United States. Those who had escaped the Nazi terror with a tourist visa and those who had been released from concentration camps arrived completely penniless, since draconian Nazi currency regulations allowed them to export only ten Reichsmarks, a sum barely adequate for initial living expenses. The refugees usually went straight from the train station to the nearest aid committee, whose address they had prior to departure. Since the aid committees were able at most to provide one-third or one-fourth of their living expenses, the Jewish refugees increasingly lived by drawing on their last savings, selling their last valuables, even their last possessions such as warm winter clothing because they feared the seemingly distant onset of winter less than hunger. Many were no longer able to pay rent, and thus slept in parks and public facilities, always in danger of being seized and taken to the German border. The reports include references to very primitive accommodations, overcrowded and unheated rooms.124 In the winter of 1939-1940 there was a clothing shortage everywhere. Nourishing food was exorbitantly expensive, and frequently a day's rations consisted only of bread, tea, and a plate of soup. The result was undernourishment, emaciation, and increased susceptibility to disease, especially tuberculosis. One group waited in vain in Brindisi for debarkation with an illegal transport to Palestine but then realized that they had been swindled. They starved, living from stolen grapes and from leftover vegetables, fruit, and fish, which they picked up after the food market had closed. The boarding house owners had evicted them, keeping their luggage as security.125 For all emigrant and refugee Jews there was, in addition, the constant psychological pressure of the threat of deportation. In the event of widespread deportations, it was feared there would be a number of suicides. Lelio Vittorio Valobra, the director of DELASEM, wrote to the American Jewish joint Distribution Committee (hereafter Joint) that he feared the refugees' deteriorating health and general demoralization would make it impossible for them to build a new life after emigration.126
The alarming impoverishment of the emigrant and refugee Jews can be seen from the fact that the Milan Committee in 1937 was paying living expenses for an average of 149 persons per month, while by November 1939 they were supporting 1,434 people.127 Of the approximately 4,000 emigrant and refugee Jews in all of Italy, approximately 3,000 required assistance. As a result of the dissolution of COMASEBIT in late August 1939, new problems arose for financial disbursements to Jewish refugees. Chief Rabbi Gustavo Castelbolognesi of Milan assumed the relief work, but complained in a letter to the Joint that he did not feel able to do this unfamiliar work. Under this protection the former employees of COMASEBIT therefore continued to work illegally.128
Because of the impoverishment of Italian Jews resulting from unemployment, exclusion from the professions, conversion, and emigration, the Jewish communities no longer considered themselves in a position to contribute significant amounts. They already had their hands full in assisting their own Italian co-religionists. The situation could only be ameliorated if foreign Jewish organizations helped. The New York Joint responded to the appeals. But even joint was not in a position to fulfill the most urgent needs because its aid program extended to all persecuted Jews in Europe, and outside Italy they disbursed substantial funds. The DELASEM operated on the basis of a minimum payment of 12 dollars (240 lire) per month to cover living expenses. With 3,000 dependents, that would have come to a total of $36,000.129 The joint transferred $13,000 in August 1939 and $8,000 in September and in October.130 The Italian committees were therefore not able to spend more than 2 lire daily, or 60 lire monthly per person.
The extreme emergency in Italy also attracted the attention of church and other charitable organizations. In February 1940 a representative of the Quakers arrived in Rome, soon thereafter opening an office that functioned until July 1941.131 Although Italian Catholics did not create their own committee, in June 1940 the Vatican delegated a representative of the Saint Raphael Society who resided in the Convent of the Pallottine Fathers in Rome to coordinate the further migration of "non-Aryan Catholics" from Italy to North and South America.132 After the founding of DELASEM in early December 1939 and the suspension of the deportations following the intervention by Ambassador Phillips, the situation became somewhat less tense but continued to remain serious.
Immediately after Italy's entrance into the war on 10 June 1940, the fascist government undertook measures for the internment of enemy aliens, thereby following the example of Germany, France, and Great Britain. In contrast to the taking of prisoners in war, the internment of civilians in wartime was not regulated by any international convention. It was undertaken to assist domestic and military security, to hinder espionage, and to impede men of draft age from leaving the country and joining the enemy army.
In France, the internment of the German refugees together with Nazis living abroad was based on the simple logic that they were all ,/enemy aliens." Diaries and memoirs provide evidence of the shock experienced by emigrants upon internment in countries that had nevertheless provided reluctant asylum. 133
Starting in mid-August 1939, even before the outbreak of war, the Italian authorities made the first preparations for civilian internment. It appears that the measures were drafted with one eye to entering the war.134 Initially, in May 1940, Italian documents mention the potential internment of immigrant and refugee Jews. Toward the end of the month, the Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior, Guido Buffarini-Guidi, sent a brief note to the police chief, Arturo Bocchini, in which he stated: "The Duce wishes that, in case of war, concentration camps also be prepared for the Jews."135 A short time later the Foreign Office, referring to similar measures in Germany, communicated its approval to the police officials in the Ministry of the Interior to treat "alien Jews" the same way as citizens of enemy countries and also to intern all "German Jews as well as the Jews from the countries that had fallen under German domination." Expulsion was supported only for Jews from neutral nations.136 Although initially internment in itself had nothing to do with racial policy, the inclusion of Jews from Axis countries changed this.
On 15 June, five days after Italy's entry into the war, the Ministry of the Interior in a telegram to the prefects ordered the arrest of all "German, Polish, Czechoslovakian, and stateless Jews between the age of 18 and 60" and their transfer into internment camps. The women and children were to be removed from their place of residence and sent to remote small villages, where they were to be in "free internment" under police supervision.137 There is no proof of any discussions between the Italian and the German authorities about the internment of Jews.138
In many provinces the arrests resembled the "Night and Fog" operation. Early in the morning the affected persons were taken from their apartments and quarters by the police and brought to the questura. Usually many hours passed before they were delivered to the local prison, where they were placed in close proximity with each other, although they were sometimes also locked up with common criminals. Frequently the cells were overcrowded, lacking the most basic sanitary facilities, and infested with vermin. Probably most oppressive of all was the uncertainty about what the Italian authorities intended. Only during transport did many prisoners recognize that they were traveling south and not being deported to the German border. Prison was viewed as a very bad experience, and in contrast the ensuing internment meant a clarification, relief, and improvement of their situation.139
Transport by train from the prisons to the internment camps was in small groups under police surveillance. Often on the way from prison to the railroad station the Jews were handcuffed, but such chains were removed during the trip. In many cases family members were notified of the departure time so they could say farewell to their husbands, sometimes for many years or forever, at the train station. Women and children were as a rule not arrested but were ordered to be prepared for internment on a fixed date. They had received official police orders, known as the foglio di via obbligatorio, on which they were informed about the prefecture of their destination.140
The Italian "concentration camps" for civilian internees were similar only in name to the German concentration camps. There was only one barracks camp built for internment, located at FerramontiTarsia, north of Cosenza in Calabria.141 In all other instances requisitioned or rented buildings were used- doisters, hospices, camps, large movie houses, and empty villas-that could accommodate from 30 to 200 persons. In the last months prior to liberation, only Ferramonti-Tarsia contained more than 2,000 internees, including approximately 1,500 Jews.142 Documents from the Ministry of the Interior in March 1942 reveal the existence of 25 camps where "alien Jews" were interned, but between 1940 and 1943 the total number of internment camps never exceeded 40.143
Except for the two camps of Montechiarugolo and Scipione di Salsomaggiore in the province of Parma, all other internment camps were located in the middle and southern parts of Italy, mainly in the provinces of Campobasso, Macerata, Chieti, and Teramo in the Abruzzi, where winter was very harsh. In the province of Teramo alone there were seven camps: Civitella del Tronto, Isola di Gran Sasso, Nereto, Tortoreto, Notaresco, Tossicia, and Corropoh.144 The camps situated farthest south were Campagna in Salerno province, Alberobello and Gioia del Colle in Bari province, and FerramontiTarsia. Only in 12 places were the Jews separated from other foreigners. There were a total of seven separate women's camps: Lanciano in Chieti province, Pollenza, Treia, and Petriolo in Macerata province, Vinchiaturo and Casacalenda in Campobasso province, and Solofra in Avellino province. They had been built in part to hold prostitutes, who were considered potentially guilty of espionage because of their association with the military But they also housed women who had been registered as politically unreliable in official dossiers.
In all the women's camps the Jews were put together with other foreigners. The only camp for both men and women was FerramontiTarsia where, starting in late 1940, family barracks were built, but these were not large enough to unite all families separated during internment. Internees were constantly moved around, and very few were held in only one place.
Starting in 1941, internees had the possibility of requesting release into "free internment." Many hoped thus to find better living conditions, especially in Northern Italy. People could request the province they preferred.145 In this manner, many emigrants and refugees who otherwise would have been liberated by the Allies came under German occupation and were deported.
In the internment decree of 4 September 1940 ("Regulations for the Treatment of Interned Nationals of Enemy States") it is expressly noted: "The internees are to be treated humanely and protected against offense and force.146 With few exceptions, this principle was in fact followed, and there were no differences noticed in the treatment of Jews and non-Jews. Methodical atrocities and tortures, common in the German concentration camps, were not known in Italy. There were, however, isolated individual instances of beating, kicking, and slapping, usually the result of lack of self- control and excitement by Italian guards; such behavior met the disapproval of the camp directors, who transferred personnel for such incidents.147
As a whole the relationship of the camp commandants and guards to the Jews who had found refuge in Italy was relaxed, whereas their relationship with Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Corsicans deported for political reasons was harsher. Resistance by the latter was sometimes suppressed with force, or even by use of firearms.148 The internment decree also permitted the free practice of religion.
Nevertheless, internment in a camp meant a severe restriction of personal freedom, similar to prison. People were separated from their families, apartments, their familiar social and occupational surroundings; and arbitrarily tossed together depending upon the momentary capacity of the camp. The camps were guarded, even though many had no barbed wire. Only in exceptional cases-for instance, for urgently needed medical treatment-was an exit permit issued. Resistance to camp regulations usually led to transfer to a stricter camp for political prisoners on one of the islands off the Italian mainland.149 As a rule the internees were not permitted to work but received for their maintenance a daily allowance of 6.50 lire, an amount that was scaled to the needs of the poor rural populace and was increased several times to compensate for the progressive inflation.150 The allowance barely sufficed for food and left hardly anything for the replacement of worn-out clothing and other items of daily need.
By performing services and manual chores for fellow inmates or selling products from gift packages, it was possible to acquire additional income. But when the supply difficulties increased during the war and the regular allotment of food supplies no longer reached the camps, there was at times famine.
The deplorable hygienic conditions and the shortage of heating in winter months frequently led to illness, and many internees suffered permanent damage to their health.151 Considering the monotony of camp life and the isolation from normal surroundings, described in diaries and records of that time, the situation of the internees can only be called miserable and humiliating. This can be affirmed, although many reports written later under the impact of news about the Nazi extermination camps make the Italian situation sound relatively bearable.152
Ferramonti-Tarsia, the largest camp, which at times also resembled a ghetto, warrants particular attention. Against the clear reservations of the health authorities, it had been erected on a swampy, malariainfested alluvial site near the Crati River. After heavy rain in winter and spring, the terrain turned into mud, and temperatures around 104 F prevailed in the summer.153 According to an American report written after liberation, from the time of arrival of the first internees in June 1940 until the end of 1943 there were 820 cases of malaria and 109 of jaundice. Fortunately the type of malaria was not severe or fatal, so no deaths resulted, but it suffices to imagine that the feverish victims lay for weeks on their cots without having the necessary nourishment or sufficient medications. Altogether 37 persons died from illnesses, which was not much higher than the average among the local population.154
Ferramonti-Tarsia was under the direction of a police commissar who was directly responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Under this supervision there developed a self-governing system by the internees which, as surprising as it may seem in a fascist country, was based on democratic principles. A meeting of the barracks representatives was held to elect the camp spokesman and the persons responsible for the various commissions such as those for health, school, and culture.155 The camp administration granted considerable latitude to prisoner self-government and was basically concerned that the Ministry of the Interior would intervene.
Gradually the internees set up a school, a kindergarten, a pharmacy, a medical station, three synagogues, one Catholic and one Greek-Orthodox chapel (for the deportees arriving from Greece after 1941). With donations from the Mensa dei Bambini, a private philanthropic relief organization in Milan, a concert grand piano was acquired. As was the case in several French internment camps, an active cultural life developed, with theatrical performances and musical events that were attended by the officials of the police along with their wives and children.156 A considerable number of marriages were also celebrated in Ferramonti-Tarsia, frequently motivated in part by the wish to obtain one of the sought-after family barracks, and 25 children were born there.157
The situation of "free internment," which was mainly for women and children, greatly depended on local conditions. The description of life in a Calabresian village in the famous novel Christ Stopped at Eboli by Carlo Levi- the author himself was interned for political reasons-applies to the emigrant and refugee Jews in internment. In the villages in the South there were as a rule no running water, no modem sanitary facilities, no electric light, and no telephone. People used a basin filled with dried almond shells or pieces of charcoal, the braciere, for warming their hands. Mattresses were hardly usablepeople slept on straw or on a straw sack placed on a wooden bedstead.
The ability to leave the internment homes and the amount of time permitted in free local excursions were determined by the local police, to whom the internees were required to report twice daily. Close association with the local residents-such as invitations to their homes-was in general forbidden and could result in deportation to a camp.158 It is therefore not astonishing that applications were even made for transfer from "free internment" to a camp, even though in far smaller numbers than vice versa. The reasons for requesting such transfer could be loneliness, lack of competent medical care, or simply the hope of being able to manage more cheaply in a communal kitchen.159
In October 1940 there were 2,412 "alien Jews" in internment camps and in "free internment," while 1,365 still lived at home. According to reports by the prefects, up to the end of 1942 the number of internees increased to 5,636 (2,139 in camps and 3,497 in villages). Up to the time of Mussolini's fall on 25 July 1943, the number reached almost 6,000, to which in addition more than 1,000 persons still living at home must be added. The increase is explained mainly by the arrival of approximately 2,000 refugees from the Croatian Ustasha state-these were brought from the annexed and occupied areas of Dalmatia on the Appenine Peninsula-and 507 shipwrecked victims from the "Pentcho," a wom-out ship from the Danube that had beached on the Island of Rhodes while en route to Palestine.160
For the entire duration of the internment until the beginning of the German occupation, the number of Jews who left Italy included at most 400 persons, most of whom arrived in South America via Lisbon. Among them were also approximately 80 Catholics who had been persecuted under Italian race laws and were traveling on a Vatican visa to Brazil.161
A study completed as early as 1941 in Ferramonti-Tarsia provides information about the nationality, native language, and religion of the internees. Of the 1,208 persons in custody there at that time, 38.5 percent were Germans and Austrians (the latter probably in the majority), 29.6 percent Poles, 22.4 percent stateless persons, 5.9 percent Czechs and Slovaks, and 3.6 percent other nationalities. Some 65.1 percent indicated German as their native language, 13.0 percent Yiddish, 10.1 percent Polish, and 11.7 percent specified a total of 11 other languages. Based on religious affiliation, there were 93.0 percent Jews, 6.2 percent Catholics, 0. 7 percent Protestants, and 0. 2 percent non-denominationals.162
Various entries in the files relating to cooperation between the German and Italian police indicate that in the spring of 1943 the "alien Jews" were threatened with deportation to Germany. In the preceding August, Mussolini had revealed his willingness to permit deportation when, in compliance with Ribbentrop's request that the Jews in the Italian-occupied parts of Croatia be handed over for deportation, he responded with a "no objection" (nulla obsta) although he was warned that it would mean their death. The deportation was impeded only by the opposition of the Italian military and the Italian Foreign Office.163
In and of itself, the wording of the German-Italian Police Agreement of 1936 offered no pretext for the deportation of Jews unless either party could claim special political reasons. Starting in 1939, there were in fact only a few Jews among the deportees to Germany. Until May 1942 the Gestapo adhered to the Convention. In four cases the Gestapo even rejected an offer for the extradition of Jews whom the Italian police wanted to get rid of because of trifling incidents such as passport forgery, currency smuggling, and an "offensive letter" to the Ministry of the Interior.164
In June 1942, without any perceptible political reason, the Gestapo accepted for the first time the extradition of a Jew who had fled to Italy a short time earlier to escape deportation.165 A week later it demanded the extradition of a Czech Jewish woman on the grounds that she was "generally suspicious." The Italian police understood the phrase, which dated, at the latest, from the arrests made during Hitler's 1938 state visit, to refer to all Jews.166 In another extradition request, this time involving a Polish Jewish woman who allegedly conducted espionage, the Italian Foreign Office raised an objection because the Agreement applied only to German and Italian citizens.167 It is uncertain whether the Foreign Office only now received knowledge of the secret Police Agreement or whether despite knowledge it chose not to interfere. During the war the Agreement had been gradually extended to groups of persons-citizens of occupied countries, deserters, and conscientious objectors-who originally had not been included.
At two discussions in December 1942 at which there were two representatives from the Department of the Interior and two from the Foreign Office as well as a legal expert from the University of Rome, it was agreed that in the future the extradition of Jews would require the approval of the Foreign Office.168 When the Foreign Office in April also raised an objection to the extradition of a deserter, the Ministry of the Interior forbade any further interference, stating that it would no longer feel bound by the position of the Foreign Office.
In a note of 10 May 1943 that was written to Mussolini but never shown to him, it was expressly suggested for the first time that the Jews as a special group be included in the Police Agreement, hence included in the extraditions.169 On 26 May the Director of the Office for Cooperation with German Police, Raffaele Ahanello, directed a letter to Giovanni Padellaro, Director of the Foreign Police handling alien registrations. In this letter, which vanished from the files, Padellaro was told to comply with the extradition requests of the Gestapo.
In a letter written immediately afterwards to the director of the Department for General and Secret Matters, who was the superior of both Alianello and Padellaro, Padellaro referred to the fact that the extradition requests by the Gestapo extended not only to German citizens "but also to the Jews who had been driven out of Germany (gli ebrei cacciati dalla Germania) and who do not have German citizenship, such as the stateless, Poles, Dutch, Belgian, French, etc." Ultimately this meant that all Jews who had emigrated and fled to Italy after 1933 and who resided abroad had lost German citizenship in November 1941.
At the time Padellaro referred to the discussions with the Foreign Office, which had added "plausible reasons of humanity," making it appear advisable to examine carefully every extradition request for non-Germans and Jews. In the draft text of the letter the addition "of humanity" is struck out. But that is precisely what Padellaro wanted to say.170 The high Italian police official's implicit intention not to become involved in the extradition of Jews raised the question whether the Gestapo had made concrete extradition demands for Jews to the Italian police between 10 and 26 May. Moreover, it is not known whether there were demands only in individual cases or whether an extensive, general extradition was being prepared. Indisputably there was danger ahead, and some segments of the Ministry of the Interior were prepared to comply with German requests. Otherwise, it would make no sense for Padellaro to have written his letter. Irrespective of these preparations, Italy as a sovereign nation did not extradite Jews to Germany, except for individual cases that fell under the Police Agreement.
During the 45 days of the Badoglio administration following Mussolini's fall, the situation of the "alien Jews" remained unchanged. The new regime, which emanated directly from the preceding regime and resembled a "reshuffling," hesitated to suspend the race legislation and to retract the internment of foreigners for fear of German disapproval. At the same time, however, it released a large share of the political prisoners, including also those Italian Jews who had been interned for political reasons.171
Only two days after the announcement of the ceasefire on 8 September, which included an agreement on the suspension of the internment, the police chief in a telegram to the prefects ordered the release of all aliens. They were given the choice of returning to their former place of residence in Italy or of remaining at the place of internment and continuing to accept a daily living allowance.172 During the general chaos in conjunction with disarming the Italian army, the telegram probably did not reach all the prefectures.
At the news of the German occupation, a general flight began at the internment centers. Fostered by the order of release,173 the flight led either in the direction of the Swiss border or toward the South where people hoped to be liberated soon by the Allies. During the first days after 8 September, the escape routes were still open to a large extent and train traffic was not subject to controls. Over 1,000 Jews, most of whom had saved themselves in the Italian Zone following the occupation of Southern France, broke out of the residence forcee in Saint-Martin Vesubie. After an arduous trip across the Alps that took their last strength, they arrived in Italian territory and were admitted by Italian border guards.174 A special train that the Italian military administration wanted to use for taking a group of internees from Saint Gervais to Nice was stranded in Italy. In this manner 400-600 people reached Rome, where they immediately went into hiding.175 By the end of September, approximately 3,000 Jews who were interned south of the Montecasino-Pescara. line were liberated by the Allies. Among these were approximately 1,500 in Ferramonfi-Tarsia and 150-200 in Campagna. Only a few succeeded in getting through the front line or in reaching security in boats along the coast.176 Still, by January 1944 approximately 1,000 Jewish emigrants and refugees were able to escape to Switzerland.177 The most favorable conditions for doing so were the places of internment in the vicinity of the border. Thus almost all internees in Aprica in the Sondrio province and in Saint Vincent in the Aosta Valley-altogether somewhat more than 200 persons, most of them from Croatia-succeeded in crossing into Swiss territory undetected.178
The first deportation in Italy occurred as early as mid-September 1943 from Meran.179 The raid to which 1,030 Jews fell victim was carried out in the old ghetto quarter on 16 October, and they were shipped off to Auschwitz in boxcars immediately afterwards.180 In the beginning of the deportations from Italy, a mobile special unit under the command of SS Hauptsturrnfuhrer Theo Dannecker was used; this mobile unit was supported by local units of the German security police and the German military police. Starting in November, the SS Standartenfuhrer Wilhelm Harster, commander of the Security Service and the Security Police in Verona, was put in charge of the arrest and deportation of Jews.181 The "Italian Social Republic" provided assistance to the German authorities by issuing decrees.
On 1 November the suspension of the internment of aliens was cancelled, and on 30 November it was ordered that Italian Jews be sent to concentration camps.182 From this time onwards, the arrests largely emanated from the Italian police, and within a brief period of time a network of 25 camps was created. In the process, several of the old camps such as Bagno a Ripoli near Florence, Civitella della. Chiana near Arezzo, and Scipione di Salsomaggiore near Parma were again used, but in addition there were also new ones such as Servigliano in the Ascoli Piceno province, Roccatederighi in the Grosseto province, Bagni di Lucca in Lucca province, and Villa Vo Vecchio in Padua province.183
Following the same pattern as in France and other occupied countries, a transit camp was set up in Fossoli near Carpi in the Modena province in late November 1943. In the beginning it was under Italian administration and was taken over in late February 1944 by German SS men. It existed until July 1944 and was then moved to Bozen-Gries due to partisan warfare on the plain surrounding the Po River. Apart from Fossoli, deportations to Auschwitz left from the city jails of Florence, Milan, Verona, and Mantua.184
The deportations from Trieste, which was situated in the "zone of operation of the Adriatic coastiand," were made independently and went to Auschwitz either directly or via the camp located in the rice mill of San Sabba. Toward the end of the war, deportees from Trieste were sent to Ravensbruck and Bergen- Belsen. San Sabba, which was controlled by the SS, is considered the only extermination camp in Italy. However, the mass murder of Italian and Yugoslavian partisans is definitely authenticated.185 The deportation of 343 Jews is attributed to the organization of the "Final Solution" in France. After crossing the Alpine pass of Saint-Martin Vesubie, they were seized in Italian territory and, after temporary internment in barracks in Borgo San Dalmazzo, were sent to Drancy via Savona and Nice.186
According to the most recent research, 6,815 Jews were deported from Italy, of whom only 799 survived. This figure includes the group from Borgo San Dalmazzo but not the Jews from Rhodes and Koos, which were part of the Italian possessions in the Aegean.187 According to older data, there were 1,915 emigrants and refugees as well as 210 persons of unknown nationality among the deportees.188 This means that more than one-fourth of them were deported, for after the liberation of Southern Italy up to the Montecasino- Pescara line, 6,500-7,000 came under the German occupation. After 8 September, approximately 2,000 of these Jews had fled from the French zone that had been under Italian occupation before this date.189
Hence, as in other occupied countries, the share was clearly higher than that of the Italian Jews, which was reported to be approximately 15 percent. It is not yet known in which part of Italy there were the greatest number of victims. With the exception of the deportation from Borgo San Dalmazzo, the number was probably particularly high in the central part of Italy-in Tuscany, Umbria, the Marches, and the Abruzzi, where most of the yet unliberated internment towns were situated and from which the escape route into Switzerland was too far and too dangerous.
After liberation, the care and redirection of survivors was entrusted by the Allied military administration to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommission, which started its activity in October 1943. In May 1944 a permanent representative of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees also participated. Under its aegis, officials of the joint, the Quakers, and the Friends Ambulance Unit that had experience in providing assistance to refugees did the practical work.190
Once again a significant number of Jewish refugees reached Italian soil when the German troops occupied the Dalmatian coast, which had been temporarily under the control of Yugoslav partisans after the departure of the Italians. In the spring of 1944, ships and boats landed almost daily along the Apulian coast near Bari where, in addition to Yugoslavian partisans, there were also 600-700 Jews, most of whom had been interned in Dalmatia during the Italian occupation.191 Jewish and non-Jewish emigrants also came to Italy with the Allied troops. These were persons who had either been trained in the United States for use in Europe or had been liberated from the French internment camps in North Africa.192
Until the end of the war a significant number of Jews who had emigrated or fled to Italy were able to go on to other countries. With assistance from the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1,478 holders of certificates departed together for Palestine in May 1944 and March 1945.193 One group of 1,000 rescued persons, most of them Jews, were admitted in May 1944 into the United States. They were housed in Fort Ontario near Oswego, New York, originally with the intention that they remain there until the end of the war. Subsequently, however, they were granted permanent residence.194
It is hardly possible to estimate just how many Jews who had emigrated or fled to Italy settled there permanently after the war. Possibly there could be several hundred, most of whom tried to go elsewhere. Unless from the outset they had another country in mind to which they could emigrate, they were appalled by conditions in the demolished cities of Italy. Altogether only four Jews expressed the wish to return to Germany in the service of the Allies for the purpose of looking for relatives and retrieving personal property.195
It is possible that in no other European country did the Jews experience the contrasts of tolerance and persecution, of hope and despair, that they underwent in Italy. Initially the toleration that even extended to assistance at the official level was mainly based on economic interests-shipping, tourism, and the acquisition of foreign currency- but also in the temporary foreign-policy friction that existed between Rome and Berlin.
The refugees encountered the hospitality of the Italian population, their historically rooted sympathy for outcasts and exiles, and an antisernitism that was not very widespread. Solidarity could be found not only among groups that were in more or less strong opposition to the fascist system, but also among its advocates and followers, to whom the increasing imitation of Hitlerian Germany and the ensuing racial policy seemed disastrous.
But even after the introduction of race legislation, the refugees had an opportunity to remain in Italy because numerous regulations, primarily the expulsion decrees of September 1938, were not fully implemented. With a tourist visa it was even possible for approximately 5,000 people to escape the Nazi murderers. From the simple policeman to the highest ranks of the ministry and army, people often encountered a humane attitude that placed greater value on the fate of the individual than the importance of following regulations and the undifferentiated loyalty to a political and ideological system. In this respect Italy differed greatly from Germany.
The persecution that was initiated mainly by Mussolini, the Fascist Party, and the Ministry of the Interior was weakened by rivalries within the bureaucratic machinery. Consequently it was possible for Jews to receive some protection from the Foreign Office, the army, and the lower levels of the bureaucracy. During the republic of Salo, Mussolini and the fanatic fascists who remained faithful to him were henchmen of the German police and the SS in arrest and deportation. On the other hand, it cannot go unmentioned that there were numerous officials in the government who worked together with the resistance movement. They courageously issued false documents without which survival would hardly have been possible.
Basically the criticism that the practice of sealing off borders was initiated at precisely the time when escape from the Nazi area of domination became a matter of life and death must apply to almost all democratic countries as well as to the fascist regime. Over the course of 12 years of Nazi domination, more than 18,000 Jewish emigrants and refugees-mainly Germans, Austrians, Croatians, and Poles, plus an additional 5,000 Jews, most of whom had been living in Italy before 1933-found refuge in Italy. Approximately 2,000 of them were deported.
The number of persons rescued may seem high. But it was modest given the country's capacity for providing a haven and the goodwill of extensive segments of the Italian population. This was all the more true in light of adverse political conditions. The image of Italy was characterized by racial policy, danger of expulsion, and possible cooperation with the Nazis in extradition, as well as by the close ideological and foreign policy ties between fascism and Nazism. Nonetheless, the humanitarian aspects of Italian society constituted a counterweight that cannot be overlooked.
NOTES
This is a completely revised version, based on further archival research, of a paper delivered in Osnabruck's "Banned Books Week," 1982; a portion of the earlier unrevised version appeared in Italian in Storia Contemporanea 16, no. 1 (Feb. 1985): 45-87.
1. For a review, see Kurt R. Grossmann, Emigration: Geschichte der HitlerFliichtlinge 1933-1945 (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 232; Arieh Tartakower and Kurt R. Grossmann, The Jewish Refugee (New York, 1944), pp. 39-41; Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europaischen Juden: Die Gesamlgeschichte des Holocaust, trans. from the American by Christian Seeger and others (Berlin, 1982), pp. 455-66; Renzo De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo (Turin, 1972), passim.
2. A comparative analysis of both systems in Wolfgang Schieder, "Das Deutschland Hiders und das Italien Mussolinis: Zurn Problem faschistischer Regimebildung," in Die grofle Krise der dreifliger Jahre, ed. Gerhart Schultz (Gottingen, 1985), pp. 44-71.
3. The following paragraph refers to De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, pp. 5-77; Attilio Milano, Storia degli ebrei in Italia (Turin, 1963), pp. 358-409.
4. For the discussion on cultural politics of fascism, see particularly Lionel Richard, Nazismo e cultura (Milan, 1982); Philip Cannistraro, La fabbrica del consenso: Fascismo e mass-media (Bari, 1975); Gabriele Turi, Il fascismo e il consenso degli intellettuali (Bologna, 1980); Luisa Mangoni, L'interventismo della cultura (Bari, 1979).
5. Heinrich Mann, La giovinezza di Enrico IV (Milan, 1937).
6. Accordo culturale fra il Regno d'Italia ed il Reich germanico, Rome, 23 Nov. 1938. A bilingual text of the agreement in Reichsgesetzblatt (1939), part 2, pp. 755-65.
7. Lavinia jollos-Mazzucchetti, Die andere Achse: Italienische Resistenza und geistiges Deutschland (Hamburg, 1964), p. 53.
8. Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933- 1936 (Tubingen, 1973), pp. 155-162; De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, pp. 123-24.
9. De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, p. 132; Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini, p. 161.
10. Massimo Leone, Le organizzazioni di soccorso ebraiche in etd fascista (Rome, 1983), pp. 131-150; Settimio Sorani, L'assistenza ai profughi ebrei in Italia, 1933-1947: Contributo alla storia della "Delasem" (Rome, 1983), pp. 30-39, 167, appendix 1 (Appeal of 26 Apr. 1933 "Agh ebrei d'Italia!").
11. Rome, Archivio Centrale dello Stato [hereafter cited as ACS], Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza [hereafter cited as PS], A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta [Box] 9-16: replies from the prefects to the circulars of 24 Oct. 1934 (443/81409) and 5 May 1936 (433/3914).
12. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio Rapporti con la polizia germanica [hereafter cited as RG], Busta 2, RG 30/Accordo fra la polizia italiana e tedesca. Affari generali: Theodor Helmerking, German Embassy, Rome, to Arturo Bocchini, chief of the police, 5 June 1937. Regarding the implementation of the "Census of foreign Jews," see Silva Gherardi Bon, La persecuzione antiebraica a Trieste, 1938-1945 (Udine, 1972), pp. 89-91.
13. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 9-16: replies from the prefects; to the circulars of 12 Sept. 1938 (443/35278) and 30 Sept. 1938 (443/48037): my statistics based on the list of names. See Klaus Voigt, "Notizie statistiche sugh immigrati e profughi ebrei in Italia (1938-1945)," in Israel, "Un decennio" 1974- 1984: Saggi sull' ebraismo italiano (Rome, 1984), pp. 407-20.
14. De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, p. 277.
15. New York, American Jewish joint Distribution Committee [hereafter cited as JDC], 718 General, 1937-39, Situation of Refugees in Italy: Nathan Katz (JDC Paris) to JDC New York, 8 Sept. 1938, and The Council for German Jews, Refugees in Italy and Yugoslavia, 28 Sept. 1938.
16. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 2/A5/1: telegram of the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects; at the border, 18 Mar. 1938 (443/9023).
17. Bern, Schweizer Bundesarchiv, 2200 Rom 24/1, 38.1.C.2j, Situation des israelites suisses en Italie: Swiss Embassy to consulate at Trieste, 5 Sept. 1938. Sources at the Swiss Federal Archives do not confirm the story in Carl Ludwig, Die Fluchtlingspolitik der Schweiz 1933-55: Bericht an den Bundesrat zuhdnden der eidgendssischen Tare (Bern, 1957), p. 84, about 3,000 Jewish refugees from Austria who supposedly fled from Italy to Switzerland and found refuge there. Therefore this number cannot be correct.
18. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta l/A1/1: Esodo di ebrei stranieri dal Regno, Milan, 13 Aug. 1938 (confidential report).
19. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 747, Massime S. 11.10.j Relazioni annuali Terza Sezione Affari Generali e Riservati: Movimento stranieri 1938.
20. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 16/Trieste.
21. My statistics, see above, n. 13.
22. Herbert A. Strauss, "Jews in German History: Persecution, Emigration, Acculturation," in International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigres 1933-45, vol. 2 (Munich, 1983), pp. 9-26, esp. p. 15.
24. Leone, Le organizzazioni, pp. 266-67; Giuseppe Fano, "Riassunto aggiornato sull'attivita del Comitato negli anni 1938-1943," in La Rassegna Mensile di Israel 31 (1965): 496-530, esp. 500; Rome, Unione delle Comunita Israelitiche Italiane [hereafter cited as UCII], 43 B Assistenza ai viandanti/Comitato Assistenza Trieste; "ll transito dell'emigrazione ebraica verso Erez Israel attraverso Trieste nel 1934," Israel: Corriere Israelitico 20, no. 16-17, 10-17 Jan. 1935. The figure for 1937 contradicts the total figure of 3,700 German immigrants to Palestine cited in Strauss, "Jews in German History," p. 21.
25. UCII, 44 D Delasem/Milano: Comitato di Assistenza per gli Ebrei profughi dalla Germania to UCII, Milan, 25 May 1934.
26. Regio Decreto 18 giugno 1931, n. 773, art. 142-152, in Raccolta Ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del Regno d'Italia (1931); Sorani, L'assistenza, p. 171, appendix 4.
28. Koblenz, Bundesarchiv, R 7 Reichswirtschaftsministerium: Reichsstelle fur Devisenbewirtschaftung, Allgemeiner ErlaB 380/35, 21 Dec. 1935; see also Jadische Rundschau (Berlin), no. 3 (10 Jan. 1936): 5.
29. Records of the Interministerial Commission in ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 744, Mass. S. 11.1.29.
30. According to the results of the "Census of Foreign Jews" of Sept. 1938, approximately 20 percent of refugee men and 5 percent of women can be considered to have been in dependent positions. This would correspond to 100 to 200 applications in the period 1933-1935 and 200 to 400 in 1936-1938.
31. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/A3/1: Circa il problema degli ebrei stranieri residenti in Italia, Rome, 28 Nov. 1937 (confidential report).
32. For instance, ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 5, RG 49/Informazioni varie dalla Gestapo: correspondence on Erich von der Walde.
33. UCII, Comitato Assistenza Ebrei Germania 1933, Busta 2/Studenti; Busta 2/Medici: various correspondence.
34. Regio Decreto-Legge n. 184, 5 Mar. 1935, in Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 64 (16 Mar. 1935).
35. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 744, Massime S. 11.1.22: Memorandum, Rome, 10 Nov. 1936.
36. My statistics based on the replies of the prefects, see above, n. 13.
37. Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933 (Munich, 1980) 1: 291.
38. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 3, RG 55/Viaggio di S.E. Hitler in Italia: list Rome. The date must be erroneous, because on 23 Mar. Wirth voted on the Enabling Act. See Rudolf Morsey, "Leben and Oberleben im Exil. Am Beispiel von Joseph Wirth, Ludwig Kaas und Heinrich Bruning,'' in Um der Freiheit willen: Eine Festgabe ffir und von Johannes und Karin Schauff zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Paulus Gordan (Pfullingen, 1983), pp. 86-117, esp. pp. 88-98.
40. Personnel files of "suspect" foreigners in ACS, PS, Categoria J 5/Stranieri.
41. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 1-14, RG 22/Richieste d'informazioni alla Gestapo.
43. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 15/Salerno: Census of foreign Jews, Sept.1938.
44. Reinhard Nickisch, Armin T. Wegner: Ein Dichter gegen die Macht (Wuppertal, 1982), pp. 140-142.
45. Utopia und Welterfahrung: Stefan Andres und sein Werk im Gedachtnis seiner Freunde (Munich, 1972), pp. 22, 27.
46. Alfred Neumann, Il romanzo di un colpo di stato (Neuer Casar) (Milan, 1936 and 1938); idem, L'imperatore (Kaiserreich): Romanzo (Milan, 1938).
47. Alfred Fischer, Adolf Fleischmann, 1892-1968 (Tubingen, 1976).
48. Susanne Thesing, Der Maler Rudolf Levy, 1875-1944: Monographie und Werkverzeichnis (Munich, 1979).
49. Peter Junk and Wendelin Zimmer, Felix Nussbaum: Leben und Werk (Cologne, 1982), pp. 90-99.
50. Norbert Nechwatal, Michel Fingesten 1884-1943: Das graphische Werk (Coburg, 1984).
51. Barbara and Erhard Gopel, Leben und Meinungen des Malers Hans Purrmann: An Hand seiner Erzahlungen, Schriften und Briefe (Wiesbaden, 1961).
52. Raffaele De Grada, Genni: Jenny Wiegmann-Mucchi (Milan, 1980).
53. Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini, pp. 479-80; text of the agreement and the proceedings of the negotiations in De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, pp. 533-540, doc. 15.
54. Records and correspondences in UCII, 44 D Delasem/Milano. See Sorani, L'assistenza, pp. 35-36.
55. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 1-2, RG 28/Emissari comunisti: correspondence on Julius Hoffmann.
56. Ibid., RG 28/Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo: correspondence on Willi von Bracht.
57. Instructive in this regard is the case of the mason Armando Antonini from Rome, who was arrested while travelling through Germany from Czechoslovakia to France. After the publication of an article in the Basler Arbeiter-Zeitung about his arrest, which was sent by the Italian Consulate at Basle to the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry declined the extradition offered by the Gestapo. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 1, RG 35/Sovversivi italiani nel Reich: correspondence on Armando Antonini.
58. Ibid., Busta 5, RG 35/Sovversivi italiani nel Reich: correspondence on Angelo Ursella.
59. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 743, Mass. S. 1.A2 Visita di S.E. Hitler: Letter to Leto, Berlin, 27 Nov. 1937.
60. Ibid., Mass. S. 1/A3 Visita di S.E. Hitler: letter from Erwin Ettel, NSDAP-AO, Landesgruppe Italien, to Bocchini, Rome, 13 Dec. 1937.
61. Ibid., Mass. S. 1/Al Visita di S.E. Hitler: circulars from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 4 Oct. 1937 (443/72632) and 10 Dec. 1937 (443/78692).
62. Ibid., Mass. S I.D.5 Viaggio di S.E. Hitler: NSDAP-AO, Landesgruppe Italien (Ettel) to Bocchini, 14 March 1938; Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 17 Mar. 1938.
63. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 6, RG 55/Visita. del Fiihrer in Italia: elenchi. Only the cover letter to the prefects survived.
64. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 743, Mass. S. 1.D6: Letter from the Gestapo to the Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, 14 Mar. 1938 (Italian copy).
65. Ibid.: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 18 Mar. 1938 (443/57830).
66. ACS, PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 9, RG 55/Visita del Fiihrer in Italia: letter from Heydrich to Bocchini, Berlin, 9 Feb. 1938.
67. Ibid.: telegram of the Ministry of the Interior to the police station at the Brenner, 10 Apr. 1938.
68. Ibid. Figures based on correspondence and list of names. See Robert M. Kempner, Eichmann und Komplizen (Zurich, 1961), pp. 317-19.
69. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 743, Mass. S. 1.D5. Single reports on Germans can be found in the personnel files of category A 16 Stranieri/1939. The number of those arrested in Rome, Florence, and Naples according to List B can be deduced from the telegrams of the three prefects; to the Ministry of the Interior, in ACS, Ministero dell'Interno, Ufficio Cifra, Arrivi, 20 Apr. to 15 May 1938.
70. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 743, Mass. S. 1.D6: circulars from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 16 Apr. 1938 (443/7032), 30 Apr. 1938 (443/15219), and 16 May 1938 (443/16514).
71. Conversation with Henry Gowa, Berlin. However, his version is contested by Mrs. Edith Hasenclever, the writer's widow, now a resident of Vence, France.
72. Conversation with Irene Kowaliska-Wegner, Rome.
73. Conversation with the former directors of the boarding-school at Florence, Prof. Dr. Werner Peiser, Genoa, and Dr. Robert Kempner, Frankfurt.
74. Basic for this question is the analysis by Meir Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy (Oxford, 1978). The book was also published in an enlarged Italian translation: Mussolini e la questione ebraica. Le relazioni italo-tedesche e la politica razziale in Italia, trans. Mario Baccianini (Milan, 1982). See also Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il Duce, Vol. 2: Lo stato totalitario 1936-1940 (Turin, 1981), pp. 487-500.
75. "Regio Decreto-Legge 7 settembre 1938, n. 1381: Provvedimenti nei confronti degli ebrei stranieri," in Gazetta Ufficiale, no. 208 (12 Sept. 1938).
76. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 743, Mass. S. 1.A1 Visita di S.E. Hitler: Memorandum, Rome, 3 Apr. 1938, with handwritten additions.
77. "Regio Decreto-Legge 17 novembre 1938, n. 1728: Provvedimenti per la difesa della razza italiana," in De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani, pp. 653-656, doc. 23.
78. ACS, PS, A 16/Ebrei stranieri, Busta l/A1/1: letter from the prefect of Genoa to the Ministry of the Interior, 24 Feb. 1939; Memorandum, Rome, 21 Feb. 1939.
79. Washington, National Archives [hereafter cited as NA], State Department file 1930-1939, 865.4016/145: Walter H. Sholes, Recent Developments in the Jewish Race and Refugee Question in Italy, Milan, 26 Jan. 1939.
80. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/Al/L: Havas inglese, 20 Feb. 1939.
81. NA, State Department file 1930-1939, 865.4016/142: telegram from Myron Taylor to the Department of State, London, 14 Feb. 1939, and 865.4016/146: telegram from William Phillips to the Department of State, Rome, 27 Feb. 1939.
83. NA, State Department file 1930-1939, 865.4016/157: Phillips to the Department of State, Rome, 10 Mar. 1939. See Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews, pp. 211-12.
84. According to ACS, PS, A 16 Stranieri/1939. Numerous examples of applications for prolongation of the residence permit that were refused.
85. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/Al/4: Appunto per il Duce. Situazione degli ebrei stranieri nelle varie provincie del Regno alla data del 12 marzo 1939: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 5 Apr. 1939 (443/62298).
86. Ibid., Busta 3/A7: letter from the police-direction to the cabinet of the Minister of the Interior, 21 Oct. 1938.
87. Leone, Le organizzazioni, pp. 232-35; David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai 1938-45 (New York, 1976), pp. 86-89.
88. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/Al/4: Ministry for People's Culture, General Direction for Tourism, to the Ministry of the Interior, 18 Nov. 1938; circulars from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 3 Dec. 1938 (443/56442) and 24 Oct. 1938 (443/79790).
89. Bernhard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford, 1979), p. 44.
90. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 2/A5/1: Statistics of the Ministry of the Interior according to the replies of the prefects to the circular of 4 Apr. 1939 (443/60601).
91. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, Mass. S. 11.87.12 Stranieri di razza ebraica: letter from the questor at Venice to the Ministry of the Interior, 19 Aug. 1939 (443/76596).
92. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 2/A5/1: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 19 Aug. 1939 (443/76596).
93. ACS, Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale per la Demografia e la Razza (1915-44), Busta 2/20/Ebrei stranieri: Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry, 24 Aug. 1939, Situazione ebrei stranieri residenti in Italia.
94. ACS, PS 1930-44, Busta 721, Mass. S. 11.87/14 Stranieri di razza ebraica: circularfromtheMinistryoftheInteriortotheprefects,28jan.1939(443/3285).
95. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Imperia: replies from the prefect of Imperia to the telegram of the Ministry of the Interior of 16 Mar. 1939 (443/25522).
96. NA, State Department file 1930-1939, 840.48 (Refugees)/1913: letter from Walter H. Sholes to the Department of State, Milan, 11 Sept. 1939.
97. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Imperia: letter from the prefect of Imperia to the Ministry of the Interior, 11 July 1939.
98. Ibid.: Appunto, Rome, 21 July 1939, depending on the report of Achille Peruzzi, 18 July 1939.
99. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta I/A3/1: telegram from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefect of Milan, 24 July 1939; prefect of Milan to the Ministry of the Interior, 11 Jan. 1940.
100. Various materials in ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Imperia and 15/Savona.
101. UCII, 44 H Delasem/Correspondenza L.V. Valobra: letter from Mario Totele to Lelio Vittorio Valobra, Alassio, 5 Sept. 1940; Leone, Le organizzazioni, p. 191.
102. ACS, Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale per la Demografia e la Razza (1915-1944), Busta 2/20 Ebrei stranieri: Appunto per il Duce. Situazione degli ebrei stranieri nelle varie provincie alla data del 20 settembre 1939.
103. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, S. 11.87.1 Stranieri di razza ebraica: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 25 July 1939 (443/74795).
104. The more than 300 Jewish refugees affected by the order of deportation also included 126 individuals who had tried in vain to cross the border to France illegally at the end of August. See ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Genova: prefect of Genoa to Ministry of the Interior, 12 Sept. 1939.
105. JDC, 718 General, 1937-39, Situation of Refugees in Italy: letter from Adolf Kronenberger, Genoa, to Kurt Grossmann, New York, 11 Oct. 1938.
106. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 720, S. 11.87.12 Stranieri di razza ebraica: letter from the Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior, 12 Dec. 1939, with an enclosed memorandum by Phillips.
107. William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (London, 1955), p. 134f.; Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews, pp. 276-78.
108. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 725, 3 J Espulsioni e rimpatri: prefect of Udine to the Ministry of the Interior, 24 Oct. 1939; Busta 721, Mass. S. 11.87.12: prefect of Rome to the Ministry of the Interior, 21 Nov. 1939.
109. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, S. 11.87.12 Stranieri di razza ebraica: telegram from the Foreign Ministry (Ciano) to the Ministry of the Interior, 24 Dec. 1939; circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 24 Dec. 1939 (443/67147).
110. Material in ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta. 3/A1, and PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 8, RG 28/Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo.
111. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, S. 11.87.26 Respinti perchc. muniti di visto d'ingresso rilasciato in contrasto con le norme vigenti, and ibid., S. 11.87/12: Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior, 28 Nov. 1939.
112. Ibid., S. 11.87.25: letter from the prefect of Trieste to the Ministry of the Interior, 20 Mar. 1940; UCII, 44 L Delasem/Trieste: Comitato Italiano di Assistenza agli Ebrei Emigranti to Dante Almansi, UCII, Trieste, 14 Apr. 1940, with an enclosed memorandum.
113. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/Al/9, Registri degh ebrei stranieri segnalati in entrata Regno per il transito e che non risultano usciti.
114. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, S. 11.87.12 Stranieri di razza ebraica: telegram from the Foreign Ministry to all embassies and consulates, 23 Apr. 1940; circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 25 Apr. 1940 (443/29489).
115. Ibid.: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 18 May 1940 (443/35466).
116. On Aliyah Bet in general, see Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, pp. 40- 80; Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish joint Distribution Committee 1939-45 (Detroit, 1981), pp. 129-51.
117. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 4/C6/5: Foreign Ministry to Ministry of the Interior, 30 Oct. 1939; Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p. 52.
118. ACS, PS. A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta. 6ID2/6: Ministry of Transport to Ministry of the Interior, 17 Sept. 1938.
119. Ibid., Busta 6/132/25 and 33: correspondence on illegal immigration to Palestine.
120. Ibid., Busta 6/132/3, concerning Wilhelm Perl's plans for embarkation. See William R. Perl, Operation Action: Rescue from the Holocaust (New York, 1983), pp. 91-98, 281f., 405-07, and Elio Levi, -Episodi di vita ebraica milanese fra le due guerre mondiali," in Scritti in memoria di Leone Carpi: Saggi sull'ebraismo italiano, ed. Daniel Carpi, Attilio Milano, and Alexander Roif6 Uerusalem, 1967), pp. 229-240, esp. p. 239.
121. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 6/D2/25: correspondence on the departure of the "Colorado" from Brindisi.
122. Ibid., Busta 4/C6/1: Foreign Ministry to Ministry of the Interior, 15 Nov. 1939, and ibid., Busta 11/Genova: Ministry of the Interior to the questor of Genoa, 19 Jan. 1940.
123. JDC, 718 General. 1937-39. Situation of Refugees in Italy: Report on the Problem of Jewish Refugees in Italy (Genoa, Dec. 1939), p. 10. This is the English translation of the first general report of the Delasern for the joint. Italian copy in UCII, 44 P Delasem/Assistenza.
124. Ibid., esp. Lelio Vittorio Valobra, Situation of Italian Jewry, Feb. 1940.
125. Ibid.: letter from Olga Syrkus, Milan, to JDC, New York, 7 Mar. 1940.
126. Ibid.: Valobra, Situation of Italian Jewry, p. 3.
127. Ibid.: Auszug aus den Berichten des Cornitato di Assistenza per gli Ebrei Profughi 1937; Report on the Problem of Jewish Refugees, p. 4 (see above, n. 123).
128. Ibid.: reports of the Chief Rabbi of Milan, Dr. Gustavo Castelbolognesi, to JDC, Amsterdam, Milan, 12 and 26 Oct. 1939.
129. Ibid.: Report on the Problem of Jewish Refugees, p. 10.
131. Philadelphia, American Friends Service Committee [hereafter cited as AFSCI, Refugee Services, Italy/Refugee Program 1939: correspondence.
132. Lutz-Eugen Reutter, Katholische Kirche als Fluchthelfer im Dritten Reich: Die Betreuung von Auswanderern durch den St. Raphaels-Verein (Recklinghausen- Hamburg, 1971), pp. 155-57.
133. Concerning the internment in France, see esp. Hanna Schramm and Barbara Vormeier, Vivre d Gurs: Un camp de concentration fran~ais 1940-1941 (Paris, 1979), and Gilbert Badia and others, Les barb&s; de 1'exil: budes sur 1'6migration allemande et autrichienne (1938-1940) (Grenoble, 1979).
134. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 734, Provvedimenti da adottare in caso di guerra a carico di stranieri, J 4/21 Affari generali: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 16 Aug. and 31 Aug. 1939 (443/06687 and 443/43427).
135. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 1/2: Campi di concentramento. Corrispondenza varia: Buffarini-Guidi to Bocchini, 26 May 1940; see Gina Antoniani Persichilh, "Disposizioni normative e fonti archivistici per lo studio dell'internamento in Italia (giugno 1940-lugho 1943)," in Rassegna degli archivi de Stato 38 (1978): 77-96, esp. p. 89.
136. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 734/A, Provvedimenti da adottare in caso di guerra a carico di stranieri. Affari generah: Foreign Ministry to Ministry of the Interior, 15 June 1940.
137. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 8/1314: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 15 June 1940 (443/08223); see also Sorani, L'assistenza, pp. 59-84.
138. Frantz Hajek, "Appunti sugh ebrei stranieri in Italia durante la gueffa," in Gli ebrei in Italia durante il fascismo, ed. Guido Valabrega (Milan, 1963), pp. 153- 57, esp. p. 155.
139. The most important report, written immediately after the arrest by Hermann Strauss, a collaborator of the Quakers, can be found in AFSC, Refugee Services, Italy/Refugee Program. Numerous other reports dating from 1950s and 1960s can be found in Milan, Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea [hereafter cited as CDEC], Fondo Israel Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze.
140. UCII, 44 H Delasem, Corrispondenza Valobra: Lelio Vittorio Valobra to Dante Almansi, 3 July 1940; eye-witness reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, as above, n. 139.
141. Francesco Folino, Ferramonti un lager di Mussolini: Gli internati durante la guerra (Cosenza, 1985). The book consists mainly of name lists.
142. This figure and some of the following information are taken from the files on single provinces in ACS, PS, M 4-16 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 13-56, and PS, A 4bis Stranieri internati, Busta 1-10.
143. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 6/20, Campi di concentramento, ove sono internati ebrei, 9 Mar. 1941. The total number of 40 camps is based on various documents from the prefects in ACS, PS, A 4bis, Busta 1-10.
144. Itala Jacoponi, "Campi di concentramento in Abruzzo durante il secondo conflitto mondiale. Nereto," in Rivista Abruzzese di Studi Storici dal Fascisimo alla Resistenza 4 (1983): 325-36, and "Campi di concentramento in Abruzzo durante la guerra 1940-1945. Notaresco," ibid 5 (1984): 131-51.
145. ACS, PS, M 4-16, Busta 25, Cosenza, M3 Ferramonti campo di concentramento: Ministry of the Interior, Note, 10 Aug. 1941, with a handwritten "si" by Mussolini; PS, A 4bis Stranieri internati, Busta 2/14 Cosenza: General Inspector of the Police S. Li Voti to Ministry of the Interior, 30 July 1941. See also Folino, Ferramonti, passim.
146. "Decreto del Duce del Fascismo, Capo del Governo, 4. Sept. 1940," in Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 239 (11 Oct. 1940).
147. For instance in ACS, PS, M 4-16, Busta 25/P6: General Inspector of the Police S. Li Voti to Ministry of the Interior, 16 May 1942; CDEC, Fondo Kalk 11/1/3 Ferramonti. AutoritA di custodia e di sorveglianza: Kalk's notes on the physician of the camp, Mario Rossi, based on reports from former internees and the memoirs of jehoshua Halevi, Habaita (Homeward) (Tel- Aviv, 1951).
148. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 12/43/1 Campi di concentramento gestiti da autoritA militari. Campo di Renicci di Anghiari: telegram from Borgo San Sepolcro to the Ministry of the Interior, 10 Sept. 1943.
149. See the autobiographical reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze.
150. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 3/11 Campi di concentramento. Affari generali. Sussidi agli internati e loro famiglie: Notes, 21 Sept. 1940, 13 Apr. 1941, and 1 July 1943, each with Mussolini's "si" on the margin.
151. Ibid., Busta 11/31 Campi di concentramento. Vigilanza ad assistenza sanitaria: reports of the inspectors. Further autobiographical reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze.
152. CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze. The contemporaneous diaries known to date are by Maria Eisenstein, L'internata numero 6: Donne fra i reticolati del campo di concentramento (Rome, 1944); Hermann Hakel, Situationen (typewritten manuscript) in Vienna, Dokumentationsarchiv des 6sterreichischen Widerstands, DOW 12923. Extracts have been published in Hakel's Vienna review Lynkeus: "Aus den Tagebfichern 1938-1943," Lynkeus (Aug. 1981): 7-20; "Traun-deben," ibid, pp. 26-35 and 40-45; "Aus 'KZ auf italienisch'," Lynkeus (Nov./Dec. 1982): 22-29.
154. NA, RG 331, Box 402, Reference 10 000/164 Displaced Persons, 1676 Ferramonti Camp: Allied Control Commission, Public Health SubCommission, Report on Ex-Internees Camp Ferramonti, 16 Apr. 1944, Appendix 2.
155. CDEC, Fondo Kalk, 11/1 Feffamonti: Campo-Vertretung; see also Israel Kalk, "I campi di concentramento italiani per ebrei profughi: Ferramonti-Tarsia (Cosenza)," in Gli ebrei in Italia durante il fascismo (Turin, 1961), pp. 63-71.
156. Autobiographical reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, V11/1-2 Testimonianze, and 11/2 Ferramonti.
157. CDEC, Fondo Kalk, 11/1 Ferramonti: Bambini nati durante il periodo di internamento. The same figure is given in the Report on Ex-Internees Camp (see above, n. 154).
158. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 741/A Stranieri internati. Affari generah: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 8 and 25 June 1940 (442/12267 and 442/14178); Busta 741j, Lavoro ai confinati e internati politici: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 4 June 1941.
159. Some examples in UCII, 44 M, 44 N and 44 0 Delasem, Richieste internati stranieri.
160. Voigt, "Notizie statistiche," p. 412f.; concerning the "Pentcho," see John Bierman, Odyssey: The Last Great Escape from Nazi-Dominated Europe (New York, 1984).
161. Voigt, "Notizie statisfiche," p. 413f.
162. CDEC, Fondo Kalk 11/1 Ferramonti: L. FUr 94, A. Rosenbach, Ferramonti- Tarsia, Das Leben der Zivilinternierten in Zahlen (Ferramonfi-Tarsia, 1941), typewritten manuscript.
163. Daniel Carpi, "The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia," in Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, April 1974 Uerusalem, 1977), pp. 465-525, especially pp. 474-75, 511.
164. ACS, PS 1903-44, Ufficio RG, Busta 9, RG 22 (1940) Richieste d'infor- mazioni alla Gestapo: correspondence about Johann Bony; Busta 10, RG 39 (1940) Informazioni varie alla Gestapo: correspondence about Alex- ander Scheibel; Busta 12, RG 28 (1942) Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo: correspondence about Ivan Kahn and Ruth Tichauer.
165. Ibid., Busta 13, Anno 1942, no. 3701-3800: correspondence about Giinther Steinitz.
166. Ibid., Busta 13, Anno 1942, no. 3801-3900: correspondence about Julie Brunelikova.
167. Ibid., Busta 11, RG 28 (1941) Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo, no. 3273-3404: correspondence about Jadwiga Puzyna.
168. Ibid., Busta 11, Massima (1942): Note, Rome, 16 Dec. 1942.
169. Ibid., Busta 11, Massima (1942): Appunto per il Duce, Rome, 10 May 1943 with a handwritten supplement in the margin below: "The note has not been presented to the Duce. His Excellency the Chief of Police has ordered that the opinion of the Foreign Ministry does not preempt our decisions"; a handwritten draft also in Busta 14, Anno 1942, no. 3901-4062.
170. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 729, Trattati e convenzioni internazionali, Massima T (1939-1943): Appunto per il Sig. Capo Divisione, 28 May 1940.
171. See esp. Giuseppe Mayda, Ebrei sotto Sal6: La persecuzione antisemita 1943-45 (Milan, 1978), pp. 51-61.
172. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 13/57 Campi di concentra- mento. Affari generali. Armistizio. Liberazione sudditi nemici internati: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 10 Sept. 1943, 9 h 45 (451/53247).
173. Mayda, Ebrei sotto Sal6, p. 63f.; Sergio Vizio, "Gli ebrei croati in Alba 1942-1945," in Notiziario dell'Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e provincia, no. 28 (Sept. 1985): 117-127, esp. 126.
174. Alberto Cavaglion, Nella notte straniera: Gli ebrei di S. Martin V6subie e il campo di Borgo S. Dalmazzo (Cuneo, 1981), pp. 59ff.
175. JDC, Saly Mayer Archives 47: A. Furmanski and A. Kaszterstein to Marc Jarblum, Rome, 10 Oct. 1943; Settimio Sorani to Saly Mayer, Rome, 15 Mar. 1944.
176. JDQ Countries, 720 Situation of Refugees in Italy 1943-45: Allied Forces Headquarters, Military Government Section, Conditions of Jews in Italy, Sicily and Sardegna, 8 Feb. 1944; ACS, PS, A 4bis Stranieri internati, Busta 9/66 Croce Rossa Italiana: camp administration of Ferramonti to the Ministry of the Interior, 12 May 1943; camp adminis- tration of Campagna to the Ministry of the Interior, 5 May 1943 (replies in 448/309817). Examples of reports of escape, in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1 Testimonianze: Herbert Landau, Nel turbine della Liberazione; and Jerusalem, Yad Vashem Archives, 0-3/3532: Report of Edward Hosiasson.
177. JDC, Saly Mayer Archives 47: Lelio Vittorio Valobra, Aiuti agh ebrei italiani e stranieri che si trovano in Italia (this report was sent on 28 Jan. 1944 to Saly Mayer, the representative of the Joint in Switzerland). On the escape-routes to Switzerland, see Michele Sarfatti, "Dopo 1'8 set- tembre: Gli ebrei e la rete confinaria italo-svizzera," in Rassegna mensile di Israel (June-July 1981): 150-73.
178. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 5/37 Sondrio: Carabinieri Tirano to Ministry of the Interior, 11 Sept. 1943; Busta 1/2 Aosta: Prefect of Aosta to Ministry of the Interior, 14 Sept. 1943; CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1 Testimonianze: Azriel Levi, Confinati a San Vincenzo della Fonte.
179. Liliana Picciotto-Fargion, "Die Deportation der juden aus Italien: Statis- tische Untersuchung," to be published as part of a volume, ed. Wolfgang Benz, on the number of Jewish victims in Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte ffir Zeitgeschichte (Munich).
180. See Liliana Picciotto-Fargion, L'occupazione tedesca e gli ebrei di Roma (Rome, 1979).
181. Liliana Picciotto-Fargion, "Polizia tedesca ed ebrei nell'Italia occupata," in Rivista di Storia Contemporanea, no. 3 (Turin, 1984): 456-71; Raul Hilberg, Vernichtung, pp. 455-66.
182. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 13/54 Campi di concentra- mento. Armistizio. Liberazione sudditi nemici internati: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 1 Nov. 1943 (451/22386); ACS, RSI, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Gabinetto, Busta 33/3/2-2/13: Ministry of the Interior to the heads of the provinces, Ordine di polizia no. 5, 30 Nov. 1943.
183. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 9/25/1/18 Varie: Campi di concentramento, s.d. (Spring 1944).
185. Picciotto-Fargion, "Die Deportation der Juden," section on "Die Depor- tation der Juden aus Triest" and table 2a.
186. Ibid., section on "Die Deportation der juden aus Borgo San Dalmazzo- and table 7.
188. Giuliana Donati, Ebrei in Italia: Deportazione, Resistenza (Florence, 1974), P. 9.
189. Voigt, "Notizie statistiche," pp. 415f.
190. NA, RG 331, Box 26, Ref. 10 000/100 Allied Military Government, 432 Displaced Persons Subcommission, Political Section: Functions of For- eign Internees and DP-Persons Subcommission, Oct. 1943; JDC, Mem- orandum: Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in Italy and the joint Distribution Committee, 9 June 1944, and further material.
191. Voigt, "Notizie statistiche," p. 418.
192. See Michel Abitboll Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord sous Vichy (Paris, 1983), pp. 157-59. Examples in International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigr6s 1933-45, p. 271 (Hans Escher); p. 771 (YJaus Mann); p. 1215 (Jean Weidt).
193. NA, RG 331, Box 397, Ref. 10 000/164 Displaced Persons, 905 Evacuation of Refugees to Middle-East: The Story of the Second Convoy to Palestine, 4 Apr. 1945.
194. Ruth Gruber, Haven: The Unknown Story of 1000 World War II Refugees (New York, 1984).
195. NA, RG 331, Box 409a, Ref. 10 000/164 Displaced Persons, 2463 Repa- triation Germany.
